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What We Talk About When We Talk About Transition: 
 The case of Cuba 
 
 
he looked upon his brother 
brothers in arm, now brothers in office 
my hour has arrived yours as well 
our nation rose our nation dwell 
 
new eyes to wield 
bearing the prosperity of men 
for the melancholy nation  
assessing the temptation of preservation 
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Chapter	1:	Introduction	
Problem	area	
 
The trajectory of Cuba in the years leading up to the Cuban revolution was heavily marked by 
an overseas rule, ultimately culminating in a violent revolt. Since Columbus’ discovery of 
Cuba in the 1400’s, leading up to the Spanish-American War in 1898, Cuba was being 
dominated by overseas powers.  
Following the American intervention in the Spanish-Cuban affair, America paved the way to 
influence in the Cuban ‘independency’, reflected by the American legislative addition, the 
Platt Amendment, to the Cuban constitution. This allowed American intervention on the 
island if investments were deemed in danger. Cuba was once again under foreign scrutiny 
(Sweig 2009). 
This trajectory of constant foreign leadership caused a victorious violent revolution led by the 
revolutionaries Ché Guevara and Fidel Castro, ultimately overthrowing executive power 
holder General Fulgencio Batista on New Year's Eve 1958 (Sweig 2009). 
The polarity of the two regimes, Cuba and US, following the World War II, also reflected by 
the Cold War, drew up new political fronts. As a result, John F. Kennedy imposed an 
embargo in 1962 banning all Cuban economic and political ties with the US. 
 
The emerging socialist ideology was shared by an increasing plethora of nation states at the 
given time, naturally creating a unity or brotherhood based on the shared ideological 
foundation.  
This common ‘brotherhood’ became a vital component to a lasting Cuban relationship with 
communism, and the instability it has experienced since the revolution, best reflected by the 
fall of the Berlin Wall in 1989. 
In the wake of the collapse, Cuba saw the end to the multilateral communistic economic 
relations with the Comecon, an organisation promoting economic activity among socialist 
states between 1949-1991, as the number of communistic states experienced a rapid decline 
with the end of the Soviet regime (Saxonberg 2013). 
The economy, as a consequence, suffered immensely shaking and rattling the political 
foundation of Cuba seeing the GDP decimating rapidly within the two years following the 
fall of the Wall, and the end of Comecon.  
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The fall of the Berlin Wall was much more than merely the reunion of East- and West Berlin 
and later the rest of Germany.  It was the first irreversible sign of the collapse of communism 
altogether. Two years after the Wall fell, so did the Soviet Union, a major partner among 
communists now seized to exist (Todorov 2009). The communist collapse meant that several 
now post-Comecon states, who had been dependent on the Soviet Union for financial 
support, had to revise their entire political and economic system in order to adapt to the 
slowly democratising world (Saxonberg 2013).  
The years following the fall, former members of the Comecon, namely Eastern bloc countries 
such as Czechoslovakia, Bulgaria and Poland would journey into a rapid and steep 
implementation of new transitional initiatives. These initiatives would primarily involve the 
installation and implementation of full democracy, and a market based economy, better 
known as shock therapy. The idea is to induce an instant ‘shock’ to the existing economy 
through the privatisation of state enterprises and a release of price restraints on the market 
(Round 2009).   
Latin America had already begun their transition towards capitalism and democracy in the 
1980s. Their transition was also characterised by shock therapy but even more so by taking 
on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), who, in return, received political 
influence in how the transition proceeded (Round 2009).  
Cuba, however, chose another strategy in dealing with the impending economic uncertainties. 
Instead of starting a comprehensive and immediate reformation of their economy or taking on 
loans in return for external influence, they initiated a gradual privatisation of their economy, 
while leaving the political system untouched. Their reformation has now spanned over 
several years, slowly transforming the former planned-economy into a relatively free market 
economy, regarded in a Cuban paradigm (Sweig & Bustamante 2013).  
In 2006, Fidel Castro became ill, and Raul was instated as the interim leader of the country, 
and two years later, in 2008, Fidel Castro officially left office as the leader of Cuba, and the 
reign of Raul Castro began. As Fidel had been the main figure since 1959, the legitimacy of 
the government took a hit, Raul Castro stood upon the challenge of creating legitimacy in 
order to keep his people behind him.  
 
In this project, we search for answers as to how Raul has been able to perpetuate the socialist 
system by looking at how external and internal factors impact Cuba. Our focus primarily lies 
with determining where the output of Raul Castro’s government stems from, and what 
processes could have occurred in deciding his policies.  
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We examine how Cuba’s external relationship with the United States has changed from a 
hostile nature, to, in 2015, identifying a common goal and, to some extent, thawing their 
relationship for mutual benefit. We also aim to understand how the collapse of the Soviet 
Union forced Cuba to search in other directions for capital, and how the search for new 
capital fostered a new vital industry: Tourism.  
Cuba’s partnership with Venezuela in the late 1990’s and 2000’s represented a step towards 
the old virtues between Cuba and the Soviet Union. However, the relationship never 
materialised and Cuba turned to the US, the unlikeliest of all partners, in aid to developing 
their tourist industry (the Guardian 2015) 
Therefore, we aim to understand why the tourist industry has been vital, and what mechanism 
established the need and, later developed it as one of the most important industries in Cuba.  
 
We base the analysis on a conceptual grand theory called the ‘black box’, fathered by David 
Easton, which looks to dissect the processes of how a political system is able to persist 
through the inclusion of support and demand as input, in satisfying the population through 
output, namely policies.  
All of our analysed empirical material will be presented as either political or economic input 
or output. The primary instrument utilised in understanding the mechanism and processes’ 
occurring within the black box, of this project, is the creation of a theoretical patchwork, 
based on existing theories on regime survival and transition. By understanding what process 
political and economic inputs goes through, in order to become the outputs seen in Cuba, we 
will be able to asses which measurements the Cuban leadership have utilised in order to 
maintain their totalitarian regime. 
This has lead us to the following research question and working questions: 
 
 
Research	Question	
 
What measurements has the Cuban leadership utilised in order to maintain their communist 
totalitarian regime? 
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Working	Questions	
 
● What are the central debates about Cuba in the academic realm, and how does these 
debates influence theoretical as well as empirical material? 
 
● What is the relationship between demand/support and political output?  
 
● What are the key points in the relations between Cuba and US, and to what extent can 
US be classified as impacting Cuba externally? 
 
● What has the ethos of Fidel Castro meant for Cuba, and what were the implications of 
Raúl Castro’s inauguration? 
 
  
Delimitation		
 
In this project, we are trying to identify what factors helped the regime in Cuba maintain 
power after the loss of their largest ally and main source of foreign capital, the Soviet Union. 
Additionally, examining what changes have occurred since Cuba is moving away from a 
planned economy towards market liberalisation. We realise while doing so, we cannot deal 
with every single aspect of Cuba. There are multiple ways and areas of Cuba to dissect in 
understanding how this changed manifests itself. One way to study change could have been 
through an agricultural paradigm, the more ideological virtue of the economic backbone. 
However, we have through our literature review identified the tourist sector as the main 
economic driver, ringing in as the new primary industry. Thus, granting little consideration to 
agriculture, other than in a historic account. 
Dealing with Cuba in a contemporary and historical context calls for the immediate attention 
to some of the areas of inquiry, which will be granted little consideration.  
We are fully aware, on beforehand, of the areas given little attention. These areas, which 
arguably plays a role are the many clashes between Cuba and the United States, both military 
and on an international political plan. 
Counting from the 1960’s Bay of Pigs invasion to the Cold War missile crisis. Granted, they 
do play a role in the distance between the country and the radicalisation of Cuba, but tells 
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little about the contemporary events on the island. Military conflict, as an area, will not be of 
main focus, it might be mentioned during the project, but does as such not hold any value in 
understanding our research question.  
Lastly, as of now, the overall historical consideration calls for an overall limitation as taking 
in the many aspects of Cuban history would exhaust the project, underlining the fact that the 
historical paradigm chosen, has been meticulously and thoroughly considered.  
Furthermore, we will regard what the presented theories in the project deem as having value, 
along with highlighted areas of interest from the literature review.  
 
Literature	Review		
 
When it comes to Cuban economy and politics, we see a very fragmented base of literature, 
which offers separate views and standpoints on many of the most important subjects. In 
making the literature review, we became aware that most of the literature and data is very 
positioned or in some cases even inaccessible due to Cuba’s difficult relationship with certain 
nations, especially the United States (US). Therefore, we found it necessary to structure the 
literature review into five different debates revolving around areas relevant to this project. 
The five debates identified in the literature review are: understanding the revolution, internal 
and external influences, cycles and evolution, theory of transitology and Cuba as a unique 
case. Furthermore, in each of the debates a number of researchers have been identified and 
elaborated on, while also being used in constructing a table to give an easy overview of the 
different researchers main arguments on the different topics. See appendix 1, table 2. 
  
Understanding the revolution 
  
What is the fundamental dichotomous debate in the field of literature on Cuban history is the 
approach taken by the scholars, which most often signals or identifies their position, in 
explaining and understanding why the revolution happened and why the regime still persists 
today. 
Antoni Kapcia (2008) delves into the events of post-1959 revolutionary movements in a 
historiographical aspect. His uses of sources are primarily secondary and archival entries. 
Kapcia (2008) sets out to dissect the reason to the survival of the revolution, Kapcia places 
himself in a different light, which sets him apart from the more ‘traditional’ chronological 
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scholars on Cuba history, insofar as understanding the cycles of inter-relational social 
processes, which shaped the mobilisation of support from inside the revolution. The 
revolution was established in its own right, and not as a bi-product of the Cold War, by 
massive popular support and a radical nationalism. Kapcia (2008) provides a complex 
historical account of the revolutionary years, taking in the successes and failures of the 
regime to stay buoyed throughout the years. 
In contrast to Kapcia, Luis Martínez-Fernández (2014), engages with a more chronological 
approach of Cuba. Martínez-Fernández (2014) accounts for the last sixty years of revolution 
on the island by providing a chronological account of the forces, politically and socially, 
which dominated the years following the revolt. The book takes a more simplistic approach, 
by looking at the historical facts and not the complex relationships enmeshed in the historical 
facts, to the period before and following the revolution by looking to understand and explain 
spectacle on the island. 
In looking for an answer and explanation to the revolution, Martínez-Fernández (2014) takes 
a very Fidel-centric approach.  Much of the book’s focus is centred on the leadership of Fidel 
Castro, Fidel from here on out, and the way he managed to wield power in the years and 
oppressed the population on the island. 
Martínez-Fernández (2014), in stark comparison to Kapcia, gives many signals on his 
position in relation to political stance, because of his overall critical stand on Cuba, 
neglecting the oppositional positive traits. The majority of turning points in the book 
indicates a critical Americanised approach to Cuba, highlighting the many failures and 
repression brought on by Fidel, in a commentary to the presented knowledge. In trying to 
understand why and how the revolution has been persistent or been constituted, it is 
imperative to separate these two notable scholars in the way they present Cuba in the 
revolutionary years. The explanation, as argued by Julia E. Sweig (2009), is that the 
perception in the US on why the revolution has survived, lies with Fidel, and with her book 
she tries to sway away from this ‘typical’ American Fidel-centred logic. Sweig (2009) 
acknowledges that the literature, from the US, centres on this tendency to provide the 
explanation that the leadership is to blame for the ideological implementation and survival of 
the regime, through the strong and charismatic persona that is Fidel. 
  
This underlines the pattern in the literature, that American historical Cuba scholars, are 
positioned in their storytelling when seeking an explanation from outside the island, when 
assuming that the survival of the regimes lies with the leadership. 
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Whereas Kapcia (2008) looks as the processes from within, initiated by the active members 
of the revolution, Lillian Guerra (2012) takes on the inside out approach to the historical 
aspect. In her contribution to the literature on Cuba, Guerra (2012) presents the many 
narratives on the island throughout the post revolutionary years, looking on Cuba from the 
inside during the juvenile years, as Kapcia (2008) did. She draws on historic diplomatic 
documents, documentaries, interviews and other primary sources to establish and present an 
insight into the island life in the years. Her focus rests very much on the censored or excluded 
narratives and voices in the revolutionary years, those who later left the island or were 
silenced by the Communist Party. Guerra (2012), as opposed to Kapcia and Martínez-
Fernández, is a much more micro environmental scholarly focus on the lived experience of 
Cubans during the revolution.  
Guerra (2012) provides and places herself in the more investigative scholarly field on Cuban 
history, as so far as representing the voices of the Cubans left out of the normative 
revolutionary narrative conveyed by the chronological and thematic historiography 
represented by Kapcia (2008) and Martínez-Fernández (2014), mainly the political actors. By 
doing that, she positions herself in between the two by looking to present the voices of the 
revolution in an attempted ‘object’ manner, by the use of primary sources. 
Whereas Kapcia and Martínez-Fernández are deeply entrenched in an academic disagreement 
in approaching, and searching for the reason behind the reach and longevity of the regime 
Sweig (2009) offers a different view on the debate.  
Sweig’s (2009) position, and intentions, is to rattle and change the US perception of Cuba, 
attempting to break down the normative Fidel-centred understanding by providing a more 
fragmented, chronological, explanatory piece of literature to enlighten the US reader to why 
the regime still exist. Still, as seen with Martínez-Fernández (2014), the argument that Fidel 
is the root and cause to the continuation of the regime still seems to prevail, mainly supported 
by fellow American scholars.  
This debate will function as the foundation for the analysis, as we have chosen to extend our 
field of research further than Fidel in understanding the current balance of power between 
Cuba and US. Although we do not neglect his importance, we aim to create a nuanced look at 
the debate factoring in as many aspects as possible. 
The field of scholars and the literature thereto exemplifies the many ways of approaching 
Cuba, and understanding the ground from which the current situation is fuelled by. This will 
serve the project with a wider understanding of the split landscape in understanding Cuba.  
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Internal and external influences 
 
With Cuban economics and politics, we see a very fragmented base of literature, which offers 
separate views and standpoint on the most important topics. Carlos Alzugaray Treto (2009), 
argues, just as Raúl Castro (Raúl), for the importance of the public involvement in the 
political debate on the island, though few attempts to actually exercise these beliefs have 
been conducted. 
  
Whereas Carmelo Mesa-Lago (in Ritter 2004) and Emily Morris (2008) argues for this 
inside-out proactive policy measure, several different authors argues for the critical influence 
that external factors have in affecting Cuban change. 
The most obvious contestation of the argument that change needs to come from internal 
factors is the US embargo. Bert Hoffmann (1998) explains that since the revolution in 1959, 
the US foreign policy has been to put enough economic pressure on Cuba that it eventually 
had to democratize. Hoffmann (1998) further argues that especially the Torricelli law and the 
Helms-Burton law, which are US laws that enforced the embargo, are clear examples of how 
the Cuban exile community have influenced the American public and politicians opinion 
towards a stricter approach to the Cuban defiance. These embargo restraints caused Cuba to 
react, and change the balance of power, by seeking partners or creating new industries that 
could make up for lost ground. 
 
Ernesto Hernandez-Catá (2013) discusses the consequences for Cuban relationship with 
Venezuela. Hernandez-Catá (2013) states that Venezuela have economic problems of their 
own as it is, and if the support would stop, it could have serious consequences for the Cuban 
economy just as the Soviet Union's stop of funds had in 1990. Now that Hugo Chávez has 
passed away this is exactly what might happen. Ted Piccone and Harold Trinkunas (2014) 
see three future scenarios in terms of the cooperation between Venezuela and Cuba: A status 
quo assistance, a gradual decline in assistance or a sudden, rapid decline in assistance to 
Cuba. They deem it highly unlikely that the assistance from Venezuela will increase. 
However, Piccone and Trinkunas (2014) argues that this is in the best interest for Cuba as 
their dependence on foreign aid is a critical weakness in the Cuban economy. 
Mario Perez (2009) agrees that external actors have had an important influence on Cuba and 
explains that the election of Chávez in 1999 led to a strong alliance between Cuba and 
Venezuela, resembling the alliance Cuba had with the Soviet Union. Perez (2009) further 
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argues that this alliance had a major influence in the decline of the gradual liberalisation 
Cuba was undergoing in the period between 2000 and 2007. 
This debate will also function as a provider of data for the analysis, as we have established 
the fact that Fidel and other internal factors are not the only inputs influencing Cuban policy-
making. This effectively means an emphasis in the analysis on the inputs from within the 
island, as well as the external inputs from outside the island influencing the decision-making.  
 
 
Cycles and Evolution 
 
As we have seen, Cuba is subject to any number of different ideas from authors of different 
position, each contributing to a certain debate. One of these debates revolves around, how 
Cuba has been able to balance their economic policy-making since 1959. Of the scholars 
contributing to this debate, Mesa-Lago (in Ritter 2004) and Morris (2008), as well as Javier 
Corrales (2004) are the ones we have chosen to mention as they provide an extensive insight 
in the debate. At the centre of this debate is the relationship between ideological policies, and 
pragmatic policies. Mesa-Lago (in Ritter 2004) argues that Cuba has experienced a cyclical 
process where the leadership has shifted from ideological policies to pragmatic policies, and 
back, almost at will, and often as a result of economic prowess or inability. A period of 
cyclical ideological policies would lead to economic inability, and a change in style policy-
making generating pragmatics ideas and economic prowess (Mesa-Lago in Morris 2008). 
Both Morris (2008) and Corrales (2004) agree with these ideas, however only up until the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. After the collapse, Morris (2008) argue that Cuba’s 
development has been evolutionary, and not cyclical, where they have constantly taken 
smaller steps towards the position they are in today. What is important in this debate is the 
future prospect, since Mesa-Lago would clearly assume that a change in policy-making style 
could happen over night. Corrales (2004) is taking a stand somewhere in between, as he 
argues that the cycles still exist, but have weakened extensively and leaned towards being 
more pragmatic. 
 
This discussion is key to this project, and we have chosen to further it in our theory section, 
as we aim to implement parts of both positions in our theoretical framework. The debate will 
also contribute to our analysis, because it enables us to identify pragmatic or ideological 
policies, and explaining on what grounds they conduct their policies.  
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Transitology 
  
Transitology is a concept that have gained a lot of interest since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union after which several post-socialist countries underwent a complete reformation of their 
economy, privatising and liberalising their market-systems. Two models were developed in 
order to the theorise transition in regards to post-Comecon countries. The first model ‘shock 
therapy’, meaning all out reforming the entire political and economic system at once, and the 
second being what is known as the Washington Consensus. 
  
Shock therapy argues for shift change through liberalisation, stabilisation and privatisation in 
the form of reforms (Round 2009). The idea behind shock therapy is introducing this trinity 
will ensure economic growth and increased efficiency because it is taking over for a faulty 
system - in this case socialism - and will therefore ensure a more efficient system. Gérard 
Roland (2003) criticise shock therapy for not putting any thought into how this radical reform 
change will affect the society in transition, because it relies on the economic growth and 
increase in efficiency to give rise to better living standards. This rapid change can cause large 
problems for a fragile state, which Roland (2003) argues is the biggest issue with shock 
therapy theory.  
John Round (2009) explains the wide influence that the Washington Consensus has had in 
especially South American countries in the 1980s and most of the post-socialist countries 
turning into democracies during the 90s. It refers to states in economic turmoil seeking help 
in the form of loans from international institutions such as the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) and the World Bank. In return for the risk taken by these institutions, they received 
influence in how the transitional countries should reform their economic systems (Round 
2009). 
John Williamson (2004), who is a main supporter of the Washington Consensus, lists 10 
important reforms that should be implemented in transitional economies, among the reforms 
are tax reforms, trade liberalisation, privatisation and deregulation. 
Round (2009) criticises this view by explaining that in many cases the process was rushed 
and handled with little regard for their respective economic geographies and previous levels 
of economic development. Post-socialist countries such as the Czech Republic, Hungary and 
Poland had to some degree been involved in the European industrialisation process, which 
provided them with some basic institutions that helped the overall transition to capitalism, but 
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countries such as Russia and many of the underdeveloped regions of Central Asia lacked 
even the most basic institutions deemed necessary in a privatised economy, such as banks 
(Round 2009). 
While some nations managed to make the transition quite well, we are still seeing countries 
dealing with the consequences from a rushed transition based on an underdeveloped theory 
(Round 2009). Many scholars have since criticised transitology for its one-size-fits-all 
theories and argued that countries are very different and needs to be handled as unique cases. 
Round (2009) agrees and makes the point that rather than calling it a transition we should 
look at it as a transformation because while transition suggests that all countries have the 
same starting- and endpoint, which we have seen is far from the case, transformation suggests 
that every economy is different and as such will have different outcomes. So when analysing 
and discussing Cuba’s transformation, we should look at it as a unique case and not simply 
apply a textbook model. 
 
This section has explained the debate behind transitology and how it has developed during 
the past years. The critique shown by Round (2009) explains why transitology should not be 
used as a one-size-fits-all model.  
We find this debate important because it has made us aware that not every transitional theory 
holds relevance towards analysing the processes taking place within Cuba. The debate of 
transitology will further provide the foundation behind the theoretical framework used 
throughout the project. It will further aid the understanding of underlying factors for 
transitions in general, and how Cuba should be studied within the context of transitology.  
 
Cuba as a Unique Case 
 
As we look into what is written about Cuba, its economy and especially its political system, 
we find that there is to some degree a notion of independency when it comes to categorising 
Cuba’s political picture. Cuba does not fit into any constructed boxes that scholars have 
created. Even though this notion is contested a bit, with comparisons to Vietnam, China, any 
former Soviet nation or others performing a hybrid communism, the debate revolves around, 
that each country has their own distinctive differences, which in turn influence political 
processes greatly. The idea is that Cuba is unique and must be studied as such, is shared by a 
number of scholars (Mesa-Lago in Ritter 2004, Treto 2009), however, when we look at the 
academic material written about its policy-making, and economy, two separate views exist. 
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In Cuba, one could talk about the influence of Cubania. Cubania serves as the name for the 
type of communist ideology and regime we see in Cuba, and is separate from others of the 
same nature. Treto (2009) supports the idea that Cuba is a unique case. His ideas on how 
Cuba is to be studied, and how we are to talk about their ‘transition’ are fundamental to the 
debate in Cuba’s scholarly society. 
  
Treto (2009) argues that Cuba cannot be subject to traditional transitology, although there is a 
need for changes and transformations within the political system, Cuba’s starting point has 
neither been authoritarian nor totalitarian. It is therefore not likely that Cuba’s ending point 
will be that of democratic capitalism. Treto (2009) further argues, Cuba’s description does 
not fit the conventional way we think of transition mechanisms, and believes ‘transition’ to 
be a term presuming regime change. Thus, in essence he argues that Cuba cannot be subject 
to the use of traditional transitology, and should instead be studied in other manners. 
However, Enrique S. Pumar (2008) argues for Cuba to be comparable with China and 
Vietnam when it comes to recent policy initiatives as he states that the three countries all 
have experimented with different forms of market socialism, they have all undergone 
revolutions and lastly they have all had different forms of the Marxism-Leninism ideology. 
In comparing Cuba with China and Vietnam, Sweig and Michael Bustamante (2013) 
disagree, supporting the arguments made by Treto (2009). Sweig and Bustamante (2013) 
further argues that Cuba’s demographic, geographic and economic situation sets the country 
apart and it is therefore no wonder that Cuba does not fit any of the other transition scenarios 
seen before, nor the theory used. 
 
The idea that Cuba is unique, to a large extent shapes the development of our theoretical 
framework, as we do not apply any theory of transitology to their full extent. Instead we have 
chosen to patchwork our own framework, drawing on various aspects of relevant theories 
needed to consolidate our argument. This creates a well-balanced and well-contested 
framework, which works with our ontological perspective. 
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Concepts 
  
Capitalism and market economy 
It is of the uttermost importance for us to make a clear distinction when talking about 
capitalism, as a concept, in relation to the case of Cuba. 
A Market-based economy is the practice of letting market forces control prices within a given 
market, supply and demand, thus factoring out government in intervening on price setting 
matters (Jahan & Mahmud 2015). 
Capitalism or market economy, as understood in this project, ought not to be understood as 
full-blooded capitalism, but to be put in relation to the situation on Cuba. As we shall see, a 
market-based economy within a specific sector may exist though the country, as a whole, 
function under different politically and economically circumstances. The scope of free market 
ought to be put in relation to the general situation on the island, as to understand how much of 
a free market is present.  
 
Mechanisms 
In the project we take use of the concept mechanisms, which we understand as a set of 
inherent features in a changing environment or system. Thus, as to understand the causality of 
an action we look to the context-specific tools, which drives change or kicks in when carried 
by change. The origin or nature of these mechanisms may derive different meanings, 
depending on the target of the change (Bhaskar 1976).  
In the case of Cuba, we look to understand the mechanisms of the introduction of market 
reforms, which then with the given concept calls for a look on the factors playing a role in the 
sphere of change. 
 
Transition 
Transition means political transformation, and is a term with origins in the democratisation 
literature. When a political system shifts from a planned economy to a market economy it is 
considered a non-transition. As long as there is no change in the governing form it is not 
viewed as a transition. Though, in this project when talking about transition it also entails 
transitions in economic reforms, because this is viewed as a small step towards 
democratisation (Saxonberg 2013).  
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Totalitarian/ authoritarian regime 
Sondroll (1991) compares Fidel of Cuba with Alfredo Stroessner of Paraguay, in the context 
of Totalitarian vs. Authoritarian dictators. Through this article he establishes that Fidel is a 
totalitarian leader (Sondroll 1991). Totalitarian dictators believe they can control all aspects 
of society; Totalitarian dictators are legitimised on behalf of their charisma. Through 
charisma they are able to gather support in form of followers. After a totalitarian dictator 
dies, the implication is that the totalitarian regime dies along with him (Sondroll 1991). 
 
Socialism/Communism  
Socialism and communism are often used interchangeably, and so they will in this project. 
Communism is more comprehensive compared to socialism, but both ideologies share the 
same core belief of equality in all layers of society. They differ on the aspect of control 
communist believes all aspect of society should be controlled by the state, whereas, socialist 
believes the state should merely control the means of production (Hunt & Lautzenheiser 
2011). 
   
Hybrid communism 
Hybrid communism is a classification for regimes similar to China and Vietnam i.e. regimes 
that has not yet undergone political transformation but has undergone economic 
transformation (Saxonberg 2013). 
  
The charismatic leader 
In order to gain or maintain followers the charismatic leader demonstrates future visions for 
the nation as one, and thereby strengthening national unity. In order to collect followers, the 
charismatic leader primary focus on social needs. When the charismatic leader addresses the 
masses, he speaks of unity and emotion (Bedel-Avers et al. 2009). 
  
The pragmatic leader 
The pragmatic leader is a close opposite to the charismatic leader; he speaks of contemporary 
situation and issues. The pragmatic leader is concerned with functional needs of followers. In 
order to gain influence the pragmatic leader argues for rational solutions (Bedel-Avers et al. 
2009).  
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The black box  
Black box in this project will be used as a metaphor for the unknown processes, which occurs 
when politicians reacts to and input, in the form of generating output, according to Easton’s 
theory on the analysis of political systems. Furthermore, the black box can be viewed as the 
reasoning behind the given output, as well as an analogy for the Cuban leadership.  
  
Conclusion	
 
The literature review and these initial studies of debates have enabled us to obtain a better 
overview of the different problem areas and their main arguments. We have found that Cuba 
is heavily contested on all of the chosen debates. More importantly, during our literature 
review we have become increasingly aware of the problem that not one single theory or 
author manages to provide a clear understanding of the transition Cuba is arguably going 
through.  
We found an interest in this gap in the existing literature and sought to expand our knowledge 
on the subject. Therefore, the literature review will serve as our initial considerations before 
constructing our analyses based on multiple theories and the accumulated data. Furthermore, 
it has also worked as a step in our epistemological process, where we aim to observe the 
underlying mechanism in search of a better understanding of Cuba. 
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Chapter	2:	Methodology			
 
Introduction	
 
In this section, we explain our methodological considerations, which function as our 
reasoning behind several important decisions in this project. First, we delve into the 
ontological deliberation fundamental to our literature review and theoretical discussions. 
Critical realism is our standpoint, and it enables us to grasp the real through analysis of 
events presented by different authors with different positions. From this discussion, we move 
on to a reflection of case studies, and how we can employ Christian Lund (2014) and 
Flyvbjerg’s (2006) ideas as guidelines in our research and analysis. As sources on Cuba can 
be subject to any number of positions, we account for our use of these, in this chapter. For 
example, Freedomhouse.org, which provides data on various channels of input into Cuba’s 
political system, however they also mainly represent the American position on many issues. 
Lastly, our theory, which is constructed around Davis Easton’s theory of the black box, 
allows us to examine input separate from output, and how these are influenced by an 
environment existing of external factors. This will be supplemented by a discussion of how 
Cuban politics develops, cycles or evolution? In addition, a rational choice perspective on 
actors operating within the black box, regime survival theory, and the theory of leadership 
charisma will be employed in order to understand an actor.  
 
 
 
Ontological	and	Epistemological	considerations	 
 
Our ontological considerations stem mainly from critical realism, first created and developed 
by Roy Bhaskar (1979) and later by Andrew Sayer (1992, 2000). We, as well as critical 
realists’, are realistic in the sense that we recognise the world, as an object, exists 
independently from our own knowledge and beliefs (Sayer 2000).  
We believe this in part to be true, but distance ourselves from realism, by being critical 
towards the notion that there is ‘one single truth’. Instead we are open to different 
interpretations of truth, and the repercussions, which follow these interpretations. Thus, the 
individual is separate from the object and has an independent view 
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of the object, however the individual can influence the object, and other people's 
understanding of this object (Sayer 1992). This is important in relation to Cuba.  
In our project we have chosen to include a comprehensive literature review in order to grasp 
the various ‘truths’ circling the academic environment. Because Cuba is to a large extent a 
question of ideology and belief, we feel that our extensive literature review is of vital 
importance because of our ontological position. Thus, we still see Cuba as the object, 
however we recognise different truths about Cuba, and take these into consideration when 
analysing our data. Critical realism allows us to account for our own position, as well as 
others (Bhaskar 1979).  
The events we observe and analyse are chosen on the grounds of our literature review; this 
assures that no single truth has been favoured. Our literature review is an ontological 
discussion in the sense that we highlight different views on the same events. These different 
accounts of events are empirical material, however they do not represent what we call ‘the 
actual’, only through discussion and comparing several accounts of the save events are we 
able to encounter the actual (Sayer 2000).  
This research approach presupposes a stratified ontology, where observable events are 
different and separate from reality, and reality is different and separate from truth. In this 
sense, the events we have chosen to observe are a product of underlying structures (Sayer 
2000). How we go about finding these structures serve as our epistemological considerations. 
These are subject to critical realism as well, and revolve around the use of a mixed method, 
which is applied critically and with constant reflexivity. Reflexivity is key in this project as it 
explains the use of pages on an extensive literature review and theory section. 
 
 
Case	Study	Considerations	
 
A case study is defined by Lund (2014) as being: “A case is an edited chunk of empirical 
reality where certain features are marked out, emphasised, and privileged while others 
recede into the background. As such, a case is not “natural,” but a mental, or analytical, 
construct aimed at organising knowledge about reality in a manageable way.” (Lund 2014). 
In the case of Cuba, it is visible that there are some physical barriers in form of the island's 
coastline, but when studying Cuba it becomes apparent that talking about transition or non-
transition one cannot disregard the relationship with US. We believe that we manifest 
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ourselves in Lund’s (2014) definition. From the empirical material we are able to select 
between what theories chosen in the project utilise in order to understand causal factors. 
While constructing our theoretical framework some possible factors not highlighted by 
theories are left untouched. Furthermore, a combination of findings from the literature 
review, and the boundaries from the theory will function as limits to the case. So from this 
definition, we believe that this project can be viewed as a case study. 
 
As previously explained, this project sets out to investigate what transitional mechanisms 
towards capitalism Cuba currently are undergoing. Since we are solely focusing on Cuba’s 
transition and not on other cases of transition, we argue for this to be a case study.  
From other case studies about transitions from communism in other countries, we can find a 
possible framework of how to investigate the case of Cuba.  
 
Transitional mechanisms discovered in other cases can still hold value to the case of Cuba 
and arguably as more than merely hypothetical (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
One can on the basis of a single case study generalise to the broader context, but this rare 
case of Cuba could prove to be difficult to make generalisations about. Cuba has proven to be 
more complex than most other cases of transition, and the best comparable case is the case of 
North Korea, which currently has the most similar conditions as Cuba. North Korea are 
actually behind Cuba in the transition process as Cuba is slowly but steadily implementing a 
gradual liberalisation economy into the communists system i.e. hybrid capitalism (Saxonberg 
2013). North Korea has not shown any signs of initiating the transition progress, so findings 
presented in the case of Cuba could possibly be used to generalise about how and when 
transitions could occur in North Korea (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
The reason for this project to be a case study on Cuba is that we seek out to understand the 
detailed case of Cuba and understand several layers of society. Flyvbjerg (2006) puts it 
delicately in his paper about case studies: “The case study is well suited for identifying 
“black swans” because of its in-depth approach: What appears to be “white” often turns out 
on closer examination to be “black.”” (Flyvbjerg 2006). 
This sums up the aim for this project, because as a first guess it seems that Cuba are 
implementing these capitalistic tendencies in order to save their economy. Through this case 
study we set out to explore if that is the only explanation, or if there are other underlying 
factors, along with the ‘why now perspective’, since communism has been deemed ‘dead’ by 
scholars since the collapse of the Soviet Union (Saxonberg 2013). 
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Use	of	sources		
 
We would like to point out and shed light on our awareness concerning the use of literature 
and secondary sources. In our process of examining Cuba, we quickly realised the obvious 
pitfalls when gathering literature on Cuba. The nature of Cuba’s international relationships, 
or lack thereof, has caused, we believe, a subjective approach from many of the official 
knowledge producing institutions in the Western sphere. We would like to acknowledge the 
existence of such pitfalls, and we will primarily approach the literature with the greatest 
criticism.  
  
This project utilises a wide range of sources, which are then evaluated thoroughly in the 
above listed literature review, as to expose and map the positions of the given authors in 
accordance with the overall aim of the project, to position ourselves in relation to the 
presented literature.  
The literature review mainly consists of qualitative data evaluation, whereas, this section 
seeks to account for the empirical quantitative data usage, mainly Freedomhouse (2015), 
Amandi & Bendixen (2015), Omar E. P. Villanueva (2010) and Mao Xianglin (2007). 
  
Freedomhouse is an independent American organisation looking to expand freedom and 
democracy throughout the world (Freedomhouse.org).  The vantage point, therefore, is a US 
centred aim to expand democracy and freedom in the rest of the world, by releasing annual 
reports on the contemporary freedom situations in the given countries, with an overall aim of 
amplifying the voices of those fighting for freedom. This is done, in a way, which enables 
comparative situations through a uniform ranking system. We acknowledge the 
aforementioned American centred vantage position in relation to Cuba wanting to change the 
situation on the island, as stipulated by their organisational goals. With this knowledge in 
mind, we strive towards putting the information and data provided by Freedomhouse in 
relation to additional information on the given subject, as to cross-reference it. 
  
Amandi & Bendixen is a Hispanic focused research organisation aimed at providing 
insightful information to companies, institutions and NGO’s with surveys and reports on 
social currents that are changing the given country’s landscape. The quantitative data utilised 
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in this project, provided by Amandi & Bendixen (2015), is granted much consideration, 
through evaluation of their methodology. The survey, first and foremost, was conducted for 
the Hispanic TV-network Univision, by training Cuban interviewers on the island to survey 
1,200 households, without government intervention (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). The 
quantitative survey is unprecedented, as little or no attempts have been made previously. In 
the few previous cases the same has been attempted, surveys have been conducted by the 
Cuban regime itself, thus proving to be unfit for further consideration as the presentation of 
data could prove to be influenced by interests.   
 
Omar E. P. Villanueva is Professor in the Department of Economics and a Researcher at the 
Center for the Study of the Cuban Economy at the University of Havana. We use his article 
The External Sector of the Cuban Economy to account, and cross-reference the reformation in 
Cuba from 1990 - 2010. His data is based on his own studies of the Cuban economy and 
quantitative data from different Cuban sources such as the Ministry of Foreign Investment 
and Economic Collaboration (MINVEC), Havana and Cuban Statistical Yearbook, Havana. 
 
Mao Xianglin is a senior researcher at the Institute of Latin American Studies of the Chinese 
Academy of Social Science. We use his article Cuban Reform and Economic Opening: 
Retrospective and Assessment to account, analyse and cross-reference the reformation in 
Cuba from 1990 - 2007. We use mainly his quantitative data, which is taken primarily from 
the Economist Intelligence Unit (EIU). EIU mainly works for clients and put in great effort to 
stay objective. In their methodology, they use both quantitative and qualitative tools in order 
to generate and analyse data. 
 
Theory		
 
Since the collapse of the Soviet Union happened in the beginning of the 90’s, Cuba has 
undergone several reforms, changing in particular the economic policies towards market-
economy as opposed to planned-economy. This chapter discusses, the black box theory, the 
concept of transitology, transitional economies, regime survival and charismatic leadership 
theory, in order to get a better understanding of the underlying mechanisms driving this 
radical change. 
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Analysis	of	Political	System	–	David	Easton	&	The	Black	Box	
  
David Easton developed his theoretical framework in The Political System from 1957. 
The purpose and idea behind his contribution is to study politics and the interrelated activities 
in the political system. The platform and basis of politics is that these activities are inherently 
about how decisions are formulated and implemented in a society. By isolating and holding 
the system of political actions as a unit for analysis, in a system, the idea Easton (1957) 
presents is that we can separate the political life from the social activities for analytical 
purposes, thus enabling a formula as seen in Figure 1. Easton (1957) compares the political 
system to the biological and physical environment of a body. A body is always immersed in a 
specific setting, physical or social, and is responding to the environment. The body reacts to 
impulses, as does the political system, through inputs. However, how the body or system 
might react to the input in the ‘black box’, will determine the outcome (Easton 1957). 
When studying inputs and outputs as a part of the political system, we also acknowledge that 
these impulses are important and have consequences for society through political decisions. 
Furthermore, Easton (1957) argues that in order to keep the political systems going, inputs 
must keep flowing. That is without inputs, no outputs, thus no political work. So by 
identifying these political units, which makes up the process of creating input, one can trace 
the process from which they are established or transformed, ultimately turning out to be an 
output (Easton 1957). 
What goes into the ‘black box’, as illustrated in figure 1 below, is divided into two categories 
of input. Easton (1957) identified ‘demands’ and ‘support’ as the main inputs, giving the 
system a dynamic character supplying raw material and information to be processed to keep 
the system afloat. Demands are at the very core of mankind as a natural component of our 
personality and society. People put forward demands, to satisfy their inherent nature, which 
the political system then is asked to deal with (Easton 1957). The type of demands put 
forward by the source of the input, primarily society, international actors and the political 
elite consists of a broad spectre of policy areas. From labour standards, voting rights to 
behaviour control. The other input category is support, as stipulated by Easton (1957). 
Without support, the raw materials that are demands cannot be processed without energy in 
the form of support. Without support, demand cannot be acted upon, nor taken through the 
‘black box’, without the presence of supporting actors/factors to influence and grace the 
demand (Easton 1957). 
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When this process of mediation proceeds, if successful, it will venture into the ‘black box’ of 
the political system. What actually happens or how it practically unfolds in there, Easton 
never attempted to explain, this process, as he deemed his theory incapable of providing a 
solution as it is too theoretically rudimental, allowing for future generations to provide a 
solution to the ‘black box’ issue, furthermore, being rudimentary in its nature it is mutually 
exclusive in its aims, as it would become too particular (Easton 1957). These inputs are then 
formulated, mediated and put forward according to the given system’s rules, democratic or 
totalitarian rule, in the shape of a policy or change aimed at a special physical or social 
environment. These new policies or outcomes interact with the environment to impose the 
changes. Occasionally, if the environment or the political system allows it, the process can 
become a never-ending cycle, through providing feedback on the policy implementation to 
the initiators of demand and support (Easton 1957). 
  
 
 
(Figure 1, Easton 1957)  
 
The goal of this project is to analyse the interplay between internal and external impact, 
identifying political input in order to understand the reasoning behind the output created 
within the black box. What happens within the black box, as prescribed above by Easton, is 
consciously left out of the theoretical foundation provided. We, however, seek to understand 
what happens within the black box, through a theoretical ‘patchwork’. The theories used in 
creating the patchwork will be further elaborated below. 
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Policy	Cycles	and	Evolutionary	Cuba	
 
Foreign economic analysis is dominated by the view that Cuba’s economic development is 
cyclical (Morris 2008). Cyclical in the sense that Cuban leaders are willing to liberalise their 
economy in order to produce sufficient goods, keep their people happy, and ensure their 
political systems survival. However after a period of liberal economic policy, the state will 
once again centralise the power, reassert control and perpetuate the system. Cuban scholar 
Mesa-Lago (in Ritter 2004) agrees with the notion that Cuban leaders have employed liberal 
strategies during periods of years ever since 1959. He describes Cuban policy making as a 
process alternating between a centralised ideological style of governing and a pragmatic 
liberalised style (Mesa-Lago in Morris 2008). For example, when Fidel in 1961 cut taxes and 
decentralised the power by involving workers and managers in decision-making processes 
(Zimbalist & Eckstein 1987). This resulted in immediate growth, however Fidel was not 
willing to invest further and the momentum died out because the agricultural output from 
1961 was spend on social expenditure instead of reinvesting it (Zimbalist & Eckstein 1987). 
Mesa-Lago (1976) goes on to mention several other policy measures from 1959 that have 
appeared extremely liberal for such a socialist government. This implies Fidel’s willingness 
to adopt liberal policies in order to compromise their ideological beliefs (Mesa-Lago in Ritter 
2004). Mesa-Lago (In Ritter 2004) identifies the main issue with cycles to be their lifespan. A 
cycle is usually 5-7 years, showing the unwillingness of the Cuban leadership to think and act 
longsighted by setting extremely unrealistic and ideological goal that eventually will fail and 
provoke social and economic effects. After this, the Cuban leadership has showed a persistent 
reversion to pragmatic market-oriented policies, which cause immediate rise in living 
standards and growth, however also equality and unemployment. This equality and 
unemployment could be adjusted for over time, but again the Cuban leadership reverts to an 
anti-market ideological policy-making and perpetuates the cycle once again (Mesa-Lago in 
Ritter 2004). 
  
Mesa-Lago (in Morris 2008) underlines that Fidel is the main driver of the cycle. Fidel 
prefers an ideological centralised decision making with a high collectivising of production 
with an anti-market approach; however, he consistently shows willingness to adopt a 
pragmatic approach against his ideological preferences in order to ‘save’ his regime (Mesa-
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Lago in Ritter 2004). The issue for Mesa-Lago, and his theorisation, is that Fidel, since 2008, 
no longer is the head of Cuba. In 2008, he formally gave power to his brother Raúl, and his 
appointment have given way for some new thoughts on where Cuba is heading. Several new 
theoretical ideas offer separate insights on how to view Cuba after their change in leadership. 
Mesa-Lago (in Morris 2008) argues that Raúl is the main protagonist of a new pragmatic 
phase starting in 2008, recognising the retreat of ideology. Raúl’s pragmatic measurements 
follows a period of what Mesa-Lago call ‘stagnation’; where the ideological cycles have been 
weakened, by not centralising the power, and re-socialising the economy to the same extent 
as earlier. Mesa-Lago then sees his theory as able to comment on the Cuban regime even 
though their leader has changed, Morris disagrees.  
 
Morris (2008) agrees with Mesa-Lago, that Cuba indeed experienced policy-making cycles, 
but she argues that the collapse of the Eastern Bloc in 1990 changed how one should look at 
Cuba. Not to say that Mesa-Lago completely neglects that any changes has happened. He 
does note that since 1990, the cycles have weakened, and that economic reform has been 
‘slowed down’ instead of reversed all together, but Morris (2008) also acknowledges that 
Mesa-Lago could be right in his conclusion that Raúl will be the protagonist of a new 
pragmatic cycle. 
 
Based on her critique of Mesa-Lago, Morris (2008) has created a theoretical view on Cuban 
policy-making, which believes Cuba to be in an evolutionary process instead of cycles. 
Contrary to Mesa-Lago, Morris weigh external factors far heavier, which create a new view 
on Cuba. From 1989 to 1993 Cuba’s import capacity fell from 9 billion to 2.6 billion, because 
of the loss of support such as loans and grant to cover account deficit, from the Soviet Union. 
Cuba then had to search elsewhere in order to secure foreign lenders, which has been difficult 
because of Cuba’s ideological differences. For Morris (2008), 1990 was the key point in 
Cuba, as it forced them to look outwards and accept the global market. Cuba since accepted 
foreign direct investments, as well as their integration into global credit market. Indicators 
show that foreign direct investment has grown continuously consolidating the positive effects 
of their openness towards foreign markets and investment (Appendix 1, Table 1). Since no 
major reversion towards ideological policy has been made by Cuba, Morris (2008) argues 
that the cyclical process are no longer happening, she does however note that smaller 
adjustments have been made, but without the effect seen at earlier reversions. 
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The discussion on how Cuba has evolved is key, we believe that Cuba is neither solely 
cyclical nor evolutionary, but somewhere in between. Furthermore, you can answer this 
question by looking at the past, not the present. In addition, since we have seen new 
initiatives from Raúl, who would range as market oriented and Western focused making Cuba 
more pragmatic and output focused. Even though Morris critique is not as theoretical as 
Mesa-Lago, this debate generated further thinking and eventual theorising by Corrales 
(2004). Corrales (2004) argues that instead of 5-7 year cycles of ideological policy-making, 
Cuba since 1990 employed a constant pragmatic regime survival strategy, which then has 
evolved into what it is today. As well as domestic pragmatic policies, Corrales (2004) also 
argues that any totalitarian system must rely on force and oppression, as well as offer ‘things 
of value’ to their allies. Even though Cuba’s allies have diminished Cuba is oppressing their 
people to a large extent. Reforms regarding free media and press have been neglected and 
although policies within telecommunications have been enacted, they are restricted and 
governed to such an extent that it renders them useless for the ordinary citizen (Corrales 
2004). Corrales therefore concludes that Cuba is well aware of their survival strategy, and has 
been since their international support decreased in 1990.  
 
This idea will be applied when looking at Cuba’s policy making, as we will be able to 
comment on processes within the black box, by identifying policy cycles as either pragmatic 
or ideological. This allows us to draw conclusions on how and why inputs become outputs. 
Regime	survival	and	fall	
 
An actor is by definition, all individuals in society, but for this theory actors will be viewed 
as larger groups, among them; Political parties, NGO’s and military etc. Actors should be 
viewed as linked with concepts from a rational choice perspective i.e. profit maximising 
seeking individuals. Actors’ policy preferences are not determined on the sole basis of 
structural and cultural conditions, they still hold some significance, actors choose preferences 
on the basis on what they deem best suited for society, and secondly for their own interest. 
Actors all have different resources at their disposal, and seek to utilise their resources as 
efficiently as possible, money, armed forces, support of powerful individuals and public 
opinion. Actors can also be non-domestic and put external pressure on the regime for change, 
or support the regimes prevalence (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2013).  
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All actors have policies they would like either implemented in the contemporary society, or if 
the values are already a part of society, maintain those values as part of the regime. If the 
given regime does not have the ability to implement an actor’s policy preference, this actor is 
more inclined to support a coalition desiring to change the regime (Mainwaring & Pérez-
Liñán 2013).   
Regime preference is a concept that can prove valuable in order to understand actor’s 
motivation and preferences regarding regimes. Actors base ideas of regime upon normative 
values. Actors have tendencies to put policy preferences over regime preferences. An actor 
does not only value outcomes of regimes, but also the procedures determining outcomes 
holds significant value for regime preferences. Hence, in totalitarianism individuals could 
agree with the regime's policies, but would still prefer democracy because of the political 
process and increased influence of the citizenry. For the normative values it is important to 
note that an actor's regime preferences is not the direct outcome of ethnicity, religion and 
colonial legacies. Regime preferences can be viewed as a higher level of policy preferences 
(Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2013). 
A regime sustains when it is able to incorporate the most powerful actors in society, and have 
them backing the existing regime. A regime loses its power when the most powerful actors 
join an opposing coalition. Hence, if the current regime were totalitarian, a powerful 
democratic coalition would upset the status quo and thereby setting the foundation for 
change. If the most powerful actor is totalitarian, the regime is strong and the status quo 
prevails (Mainwaring & Pérez-Liñán 2013).  
Charismatic	leadership	theory	
 
Max Weber identifies three types of legitimate authority: 1) rational- legal, 2) traditional and 
3) charismatic. The rational- legal legitimate authority can be compared with the modern day 
democracy where a leader is elected on behalf of the population. Traditional legitimate 
authority can be viewed as kingdoms and monarch hierarchies where power is passed on 
through generations of the same family. Lastly, there is the charismatic legitimate authority, 
where the leader holds or gains power through charisma (Mixon 2009). 
Charisma is not an attribute that leaders impose on themselves; it has to be granted by 
followers. Charisma makes the leader seem outstanding to other individuals in society, and 
grants the leader a sense of divine power, making him appear as a superhuman. This kind of 
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charisma can be generated through heroic acts, a strong mission and values that followers can 
relate to. Charisma is a personal attribute cannot be passed from the leader to a successor. 
Weber argues that a totalitarian regime changes from charismatic legitimacy towards 
rational- legal legitimacy (Mixon 2009).  
Weber’s definition of the charismatic leader can provide partial answers in the understanding 
of how Fidel’s regime survived for so long, and what changes the passing of power could 
imply, through Weber’s understanding of the legitimate totalitarian regime. Along with the 
theory of regime survivals definition of actors, this could prove valuable as to understand the 
change in leadership.  
This part of the theoretical patchwork will be utilised in order to provide possible 
explanations for what occurs within the black box. Hence, understanding how leaders react to 
inputs, and what processes they undergo as inputs turns to output.  
  
Operationalisation	
 
This section will focus on how we put these theoretical considerations into work, and how the 
different concepts will function in relation to our data. The overarching grand theory of this 
project is Easton’s approach to the analysis of political systems, allowing us to understand 
what and how input from actors create reactions from the regime, but also to identify 
channels of input, and the subsequent process of output i.e. the creating of policies. This 
further allows separation of the social from the political while studying interrelated political 
activities. The discussion between different understandings of Cuban politics, a cyclical 
process, and an evolutionary process will further Easton’s ideas. From this discussion, we 
highlight the concepts of pragmatic versus ideological politics, which will help us understand 
the output of the black box, as well as how input it grasped within the black box. Perpetuation 
and stagnation will also be used to describe Cuba’s economic policy in order to explain the 
evolutionary traits of Cuba’s political development, together with external influence.  
 
From here on, we apply a more rational set of ideas to our data sets, namely the theory of 
regime survival. Here, we employ the idea that within the black box, we see a set of rational 
choice actors, aiming for their regime to survive, and perpetuate the system. This theory 
sheds light on what processes occurs inside the black box, something which Easton’s black 
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box theory is not capable of. Here the concept of external versus internal pressure is also 
weighted against data on tourism, and public impact.  
 
In order to conceptualise about what is creating output inside of the black box, we turn to 
Weber’s theory of charismatic leadership. Here, basic ideas of ethos, charisma and the ability 
to create a strong self-image outwardly are examined, but also the possibility of passing on 
one's ethos in relation to the change in leadership we have seen in Cuba. Lastly, the 
possibility of creating an ethos, by leaning up against someone else's is explored, as we look 
at the relationship between Barack Obama and Raúl. 
Conclusion	
 
In this Chapter, we have accounted for our critical realist standpoint, which enable us to 
examine the truth from a series of events that can be described as ‘personal’ as they depict the 
individual truth of the author. We took this critical standpoint because of the large number of 
positions towards Cuba, as a result of their polarising ideology. Our ontological consideration 
is also what spawned our literature review in chapter 1, and our extensive theoretical 
discussion.  
 
The idea is that concepts provided by transition- and regime survival theories will provide the 
foundation, which factors could hold value as transition mechanisms, and to conceptualise the 
analysis of political systems to an empirical founded argument. Hence, guiding research in 
what factors should be investigated. Furthermore, the basic assumption from regime survival 
theory suggests that a shift, among actors, in opinion can disturb the status quo, thereby, 
forcing the regime to alter policies in order to prevent the opposing coalition of actors to 
gather in strength.  
 
We do not seek to offer numerical value of how much factors accounted for in the process, 
but only to uncover if it can be assigned some value in the transition process.   
Regarding transitology, we have established that specific elements are not useful due to its 
one-size-fits-all mentality. More specifically the shock therapy model and Washington 
Consensus theory as they do not take into account the economic foundation the country in 
transition have beforehand  - this could arguably be even more true in the case of Cuba due to 
its complex nature. However, it has also been established that a continuous development from 
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other authors, who realised these faults, have resulted in theories such as policy cycles and 
evolutionary reformation. Combined, the project seeks to operationalise these in order to 
identify transitional mechanisms that guide political reformation and transition in Cuba. 
 
 
Chapter	3:	Historical	Perspectives	
 
Introduction	
 
Through this chapter we will create a descriptive foundation for the analysis in Chapter 4. 
Furthermore, it will be used to understand the background of the complex relationship 
between US and Cuba. Secondly, explore how the current system was established in the first 
place. Thirdly, a chronological timeline of how Cuba has regulated the economy ranging 
from 1990- 2015. 
US	and	Cuba	
 
The political crisis from which the revolutionaries partially derived its legitimacy is rooted in 
a prolonged era of recurring foreign colonial rule. 
Since Christopher Columbus discovered the island of Cuba in 1492 and until the end of the 
Spanish-American war in 1898, Cuba was effectively under Spanish rule, gaining 
independence from foreign rulers did not effectively mean total freedom. Their liberators, in 
this case the US, somewhat claimed victor’s rule. American presence from that point on only 
accelerated with investments in the agricultural sector (Sweig 2009). These investments 
indirectly became a point of conflict when the two crises intersect blatantly, where exogenous 
forces introduce endogenous political legislation on the island to regulate and ensure 
American economic investments, mainly with focus on the sugar industry. In other words, in 
the wake of the American victory they swiftly introduced and adopted the Platt Amendment 
into the Cuban constitution in 1902 (Martínez-Fernandez 2014). The Platt Amendment 
entailed provisions legitimising American intervention with any Cuban domestic legislation if 
their investments where deemed in jeopardy or if Cuba were thought unfit to serve and 
protect American investments. The trajectory the Platt Amendment set out caused much 
distortion, in many ways setting the pillars from which the revolution would build on. By 
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1923, the US had taken use of the Platt Amendment three times, with military occupational 
intervention staying up to three years at the time (Sweig 2009). This constant presence from 
the outside nurtured a growing frustration with the military occupation among the island's 
citizens. What spurred and initiated the first move towards a political mobilisation against the 
US, and the foundation of the first Cuban Communist Party and nationalistic party, was again 
the embarrassment the Platt Amendment brought on to the idea of Cuban sovereignty and 
independence (Sweig 2009). 
		
How	the	political	system	came	to	be,	and	how	history	shaped	ideology	
  
What is worth having in mind following the revolutionaries’ victory was that it had never 
been politically charged, at the time, revolution was not equal to communism (Sweig 2009). 
The proclaimed goal of the revolt was to cut the ties to the US, and not impose a political 
ideology. With the triumph of the revolution, Fidel and the 26th of July movement saw an 
opportunity to do away with the US influence on the island, the believed causality to the 
many failures of the country. Failures ranging from economic dependence to a political 
culture engulfed with corruption. The 26th of July movement was the vanguard party that 
overthrew the government in 1959. The objectives set forth by the leaders of the 
revolutionary movement, however, were vaguely phrased as they merely voiced a desire for 
independence, social justice and a ‘clean’ government (Sweig 2009). 
  
The first year in charge of the government matters were mainly characterised by a somewhat 
overwhelming approach, reflected by a missing guideline or ideology, to the fact that the 
Castro government now needed an approach, something that would follow the lines set out 
during the revolutionary years, an ideology that would do away with the Americans and 
invoke social justice (Sweig 2009). What glued and sustained the newly seized control on the 
island together in the early years, was the personality and presence of the leadership 
represented by Fidel (Martínez-Fernández 2014). 
Following a couple of failed appointments to the position as commander in chief on the 
island by the revolutionary cabinet, within a couple of months after the revolution, the 
government’s policies were on collision course with domestic and international actors. 
Despite Fidel’s promise in February 1959 ”Revolution now, elections later”. (Fidel Castro in 
Perez 2014), few vigorous democratic attempts were made as to give back what was 
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rightfully theirs to take from the Americans; their right to make decisions not influenced by 
foreigners (Sweig 2009). 
Fidel anticipated the arrival of the Americans as they saw the rattling of the Cuban political 
foundation as an opportunity to invade the country, once again, to seize control and 
overthrow the Cuban Revolution. This prompted him to officially, for the first time, declare 
himself a socialist. Three months later, and a failed invasion richer, the 26th of July and the 
PSP, the Cuban Communist Party, merged into one single party, which by 1965 got the 
current name, Partido Communista de Cuba (PCC) (Sweig 2009). In the meantime, Fidel, the 
now instated secretary of the PCC and power holder, had evolved from a socialist to a 
“Marxist-Leninist”. As a consequence of this ideological adoption, the end to the Western 
liberal democracy was brought on with the appointment of Fidel and the one-party system, as 
Cuba’s vulnerability to the declared enemy, the US, was identified as the capitalistic 
exploitation and political dominance (Sweig 2009).  
Cuba saw the establishment of a more foundational rooted regime in 1976 with a new 
constitution more explicitly setting out the parameters of governance, with articles dictating 
the ideological foundations. The foundation of the philosophy or ideology, from which Cuba 
elaborated, is founded upon Vladimir Lenin’s interpretation of Marxism (Sweig 2009). The 
most basic traits of the ideology, which was seen manifested on Cuba, was the gradual 
transition from capitalism towards socialism through the introduction of planned economy 
and five-year plans, as seen on Cuba stipulated by article 14 “The State organises, directs and 
controls the national economic activity according to a plan…” (Constitution Net 2015) The 
ultimate goal of the ideology is to develop and implement a socialistic ideology, through the 
one-party system and a revolutionary party in charge, to achieve full-scale communism with a 
classless social sphere, full equality for all and collective ownership of the factors of 
production. The first step, again dictated by the constitution, was fuelled by article 16, which 
set forward the importance of the vanguard party “The State directly administers the assets 
comprising the socialist property of all the people” and identifying the rulers as  ” The 
Communist Party of Cuba, Martian and of Marxist-Leninist, the organised vanguard of the 
Cuban nation, is the superior leading force of the society and the State, organising and 
guiding the common efforts aimed at the highest goals of the construction of socialism and 
advancement toward the communist society. ”  (Constitution Net 2015) 
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The development of the actual ideology ought to be viewed as a result of the polarisation 
between the US and Cuba, as Cuba’s relationship with the Soviet Union grew closer during 
the Cold War years. The PCC constantly clamoured that the ideological allegiance with the 
Soviet Union ought to be viewed as a result of Cuba’s elongated search for independence 
from the US (Sweig 2009).  
This in effect meant the establishment of the legislative branch named the unicameral 
National Assembly of People’s Power, with regional assemblies too. The deputies of the 
National Assembly are the people behind electing members to the Council of State, which 
works as the executive branch consisting of a president, who is also the secretary of the PCC, 
a primary vice president and several other secondary vice presidents. These elections were 
widely hailed, by members of the PCC, as democratic and participatory, though Fidel’s 
power at the given time was hegemonic and uncontested. Furthermore, to conclude the last 
branch of government is the judiciary branch, namely the Supreme Court ruling on 
constitutional matters (Sweig 2009). 
  
Cuba’s	market	liberalisation		
 
In the 1980s, the Cuban economy was based on a communist model, which was characterised 
by plan-economy, public-property and a homogenised agriculture heavily dependent on their 
sugar export at favourable prices to the Soviet Union. This all changed with the collapse of 
the Soviet Union and a new era within Cuba’s economy started in the 1990s. This section will 
account for the economic reformations that took place after 1990 and have gradually 
liberalised the Cuban economy up until 2015. 
 
1990 - 1993 
The first countermeasures by Cuba towards an impending economic crisis came in 1990 by 
introducing reforms focused on food shortage, development of products that could increase 
foreign capital, decreasing budget deficits by adopting austerity measures, economic 
flexibility and a healthy economic environment (Xianglin 2007). 
To avoid shortages of food and energy Cuba implemented laws that reduced consumption on 
food and gas as well as a strict rationing system. Economic flexibility was improved by 
implementing a system that rewarded citizens by allowing them to keep cows and pigs and 
grow other food sources in their gardens. More importantly, the Cuban businesses gained 
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more autonomy as the state’s monopoly on international trade was removed. To achieve an 
increased export and a more attractive and healthy economic environment they started 
expanding their efforts on developing medical equipment and biotechnologies. However, it 
was the expansion in the tourist industry that paid off and by 1994 it started bringing in more 
profits than the sugar industry (Xianglin 2007). 
 
1993 - 1996 
The economic opening was further expanded in 1993 when Fidel permitted the US dollar as a 
currency in Cuba and allowed private businesses and self-employment to exist. The private 
economy quickly started expanding and by 1995 it was estimated that 200.000 Cubans were 
self-employed (Xianglin 2007). 
A gradual transformation from a public owned agricultural sector towards a more liberalised 
one also begun in 1993 when the government started leasing out state farms. By 1999 only 
23.7% of the agricultural sector were state farms, while 45.6% consisted of these new 
cooperative farms (Xianglin 2007). In 1994, a new tax system was implemented, a 
reformation of their banking system initiated and a free market opened up for agricultural, 
industrial and handicraft products. However, the market was only open for producers after 
they fulfilled their quotas and certain products were restricted. In 1995, Cuba introduced the 
Law of Foreign Investment, which opened up for foreign investment in almost all economic 
sectors while also allowing foreigners to buy real estate in Cuba (Xianglin 2007). 
 
1996 - 2001 
In 1997, the banking sector was split into two entities. The first entity was in charge of only 
commercial banking while the new entity, called the Central Bank of Cuba, was in charge of 
supervising the restructure of the financial system, printing of currency, implementation of 
monetary policies, loan and exchange rates and foreign debt (Xianglin 2007). 
In 1998, the Cuban government started reforming the laws regarding Cuban firms. The focus 
was on reducing the management and influence that the government had had over the firms 
so far. This was done by strengthening the staff, a reward system that rewarded the 
individuals that worked harder and a self-evaluation system to keep the firms accountable and 
increase efficiency (Xianglin 2007). 
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2001 - 2008 
In 2002 the diversification of their agricultural sector begun by re-assigning 67% of the 
cultivated land to producing other agricultural products. This further involved the 
replacement of 100.000 former sugar workers. The agricultural sector was further liberalised 
by allowing farmers to keep 75% of their income, hire foreign workers and buy products 
from other farms (Xianglin 2007). 
By 2004, Cuban oil and gas production had increased from 500.000 to 3.887.000 tons while 
also gaining international favour thereby increasing foreign investment firms from 5 to 362. 
By 2008, the revenues generated from tourism matched the revenues generated by total 
exported goods, again stressing the prosperity of tourism (Villanueva 2010). 
However, while the previous years had been dominated by a gradual yet effective 
liberalisation, the period between 2000 and 2003 showed signs of stagnation mainly because 
the leadership refused to implement much needed reforms (Pérez-López 2003). 
 
2008 - 2015 
An official change in leadership in 2008 boded new times in the form of Raúl as the new 
President of Cuba. In 2010, Raúl announced "We reform or we Sink" and the gradual 
reformation of the Cuban economy started again, focusing primarily on paying off foreign 
debt, reducing imports and public expenses and fighting corruption (Sweig & Bustamante 
2013). 
Reforms aimed at integrating 500.000 state-employees into the private sector with the final 
goal being 1,8 million workers, was also initiated in 2010 and although they have only 
managed to integrate 400.000, it is still a 154% increase. The agricultural sector has been 
further privatised and now accounts for 57% of Cuba’s total food production, occupying 25% 
of the cultivable land (Sweig & Bustamante 2013).  
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(Figure 2, Worldbank.org 2015) 
 
The Cuban economy have undergone gradual yet significant liberalised and privatised 
reformation since 1990, which have helped the country keep afloat and even increase their 
GDP in an otherwise chaotic period, influenced by both internal and external factors, as 
shown in Figure 2. The future question lies in how Cuba will proceed with the transformation 
of their economy and if the US will keep the embargo or start opening up for cooperation 
between Washington and Havana. 
External	Relations	
 
The loss of Cuba’s most important ally, the Soviet Union, and financial aid deriving from the 
East threw their economy back into turmoil. The increasingly democratisation of the world 
nations meant increasingly more capitalistic economies and therefore fewer communist allies 
for Cuba to trade and seek support from (Sweig 2009). Fidel’s options were limited and so he 
ultimately recognised the need to give in to the mounting international pressure in order to 
develop his country’s economy (Mesa-Lago in Morris 2008). 
As a result of the collapse of the Soviet Union, the Cuban leadership embarked upon a 
liberalisation of their economy, in order to make up for the economic regression caused to the 
dissolvent of the Soviet Union. 
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In 1995, a law proposition by Senator Helms and Representative Burton was put forward, 
enforcing the Cuban embargo. At first, the passing of the law seemed unlikely and even 
President Bill Clinton had expressed that he would veto the law in its current form. However, 
the shooting of two planes, and thereby killing of four American citizens, by the Cuban Air 
force in 1996, changed the political climate, resulting in the Helms-Burton law being passed 
in an almost unanimously vote, in both chambers (Hoffmann 1998). 
The Helms-Burton law introduced three main enforcements of the embargo. Firstly, it made it 
impossible for the US President to abolish the embargo, instead making an abolishment only 
possible through a congressional approval. Secondly, it established that the embargo would 
only be lifted when a transition towards democracy had taken place, ensuring a regime with 
free elections and without Fidel or Raúl. Thirdly, it made it possible for American citizens to 
sue for the property lost during the seizure of US businesses and assets in 1959 but only when 
the transitional regime had taken over (Hoffmann 1998). 
The Helms-Burton law was a serious enforcement of the embargo, worsening US-Cuban 
relations even more, as well as causing an international outcry from especially Europe. 
 
Conclusion	
 
This chapter have accounted for Cuba’s history since the revolution, their economic 
reformation since 1990 and their relationship with external actors. The chapter have been 
limited to these specific areas based on our literature review, and will provide the foundation 
for our analysis as we have obtained the required knowledge in order to conduct a thorough 
analysis.  
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Chapter	4:	Analysis	
 
Introduction	
 
In this chapter, we strive to analyse how input turn to output in Cuba’s political system, as an 
overarching political persistence theory, but also attempting to get into the black box, and 
look at some of the characteristics of the leadership as well as their reasoning behind 
conducting their policies. We first experience a missing link between public demands, and 
the black box, however realise that public demand is to a large extent appeased by the 
government using tourism as the main tool, as Raúl is able to meet the demand of the 
population with its outcomes. As we look at how power and charisma is transferred between 
two leaders, we learn that Raúl was forced to act differently than Fidel, and therefore looked 
more towards the US when developing the tourist sector Fidel had started back in the 1990, 
as a result of the dissolvent of the Soviet Union. A partnership with Venezuela slowed the 
development of pragmatic policies, however Cuba was under pressure from the US embargo, 
and saw the partnership as a return to ideology and with eminent economic upside. 
Ultimately, Raúl recognised how a relationship with the US could benefit him through 
growing the industry and the economy.  
 
 
Public	opinion	–	and	why	demands	are	non-existent	
  
In order to examine and understand the output of the political system in wielding power and 
staying afloat, it is of paramount importance to analyse the demand input, as stipulated by 
Easton (1957).  In looking at how demands are transformed into issues, a clearer and more 
vivid picture of how processes of demand shape output, or in some cases do not affect the 
political system is presented. To evaluate the demand capabilities in the case of Cuba, a 
closer look at the possibilities of how people affect the output will be established through an 
analysis of public opinion and what demands they put forward. This section will provide the 
foundation to a wider discussion on the totalitarian regime’s tools to secure the survival of the 
ideology. 
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Nature	of	the	demand,	what	kind	of	demand	prevails	
  
In assessing how demands arise and what characteristics they bring with them, to create 
input, in the analysis of the Cuban political system, we must consider the origins and nature 
of the demands put forward by Easton (1957); namely external and internal factors. 
The external demands are distinguishable and separable systems from each other, such as the 
economy, social structure, demography and culture. Each of these different systems, shape 
and nurture in their own ecology, the variables that constitutes a demand entering the ‘black 
box’ of the political system.  
In other words, members operate within a different setting of a culture, to generate specific 
objectives that they, the people, feel are paramount to activate, which creates a specific 
systemic type of demand (Easton 1957). 
In trying to understand, what kind of culture or system prevails on the island of Cuba in 
establishing a demand, we must look and identify the people’s opinion on the external 
environment’s major area of inquiry. In doing so, we utilise a survey done by the research 
firm Amandi & Bendixen International conducted for Univision, a Hispanic television 
networked based in the US, and in collaboration with the Washington Post in March 2015, 
through face-to-face interviews with 1,200 adults in Cuba. Locally trained Cubans without 
government consent or authorisation conducted this public survey. Public surveys on the 
island are very rare, and when they occasionally do come up they are heavily influenced and 
sponsored by the government or anti-Castro organisation skewing the poll results (The 
Washington Post 2015). 
  
Reading from the survey and analysing the data in relation to Easton’s (1957) theory in 
identifying the system in the environment through the expressed demand, two standout 
systems are identified as areas of potential conflict if not tended to. If a culture or system is 
deemed in short supply relative to the demand, a conflict may arise if not acted upon in the 
‘black box’ of political processes to produce an output alleviating the short supply. 
  
Reading and understanding the data presented in the survey a major area of potential conflict, 
due to short supply relative to the demand is to be found in the economic sector. In the 
survey, when asked “Thinking of the next 5 years, name the one thing you would like the 
Cuban government to do to improve your personal situation”, 54% would like to improve 
their economic opportunities where as a mere 7% would like to see a general improvement of 
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quality of life on the island (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). Asking somewhat the same 
question, but directing it toward a more collective view in a current time frame by asking 
“what do the people of Cuba need most at this given time?” we see 48% seeking an improved 
economy, which is twice as much as the two second most desired improvements of the open 
political system (24%) and improved quality of life (24%) (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). 
Taking in the environmental collective mass opinion as stipulated by Easton’s (1957) theory, 
a pattern starts to arise in exploring the demand of a particular system in short supply. These 
questions are phrased in such a manner that they explicitly state the most desired area, or 
system of improvement. 
Asking “how satisfied are you with the economic system that exists today in Cuba?” a clearer 
picture of what the sampled survey are looking towards is presented. A total of 79% are 
either not too/not at all satisfied with the current system in place (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). 
With emphasis on the economic system, what can be derived from this data is an overall 
major dissatisfaction with the current way of conducting economic systems, based on the 
revolutionary virtues. This argument is furthered when asked if  “…Tourism can benefit 
Cuba because it can lead to the creation of jobs, bring wealth, and eventually improve the 
overall situation on the island.” (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). With 96% agreeing on tourism 
as the ‘solution’ to the current economic state of affairs, with a mere 2% fearing that it will 
harm Cuba and ruin the values of the revolution (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). 
  
Having identified a system in disequilibrium, popular support wise, and established that the 
economic improvement is the prime point of confliction and a point of demand, an interesting 
question arises insofar as understanding whether or not this can be read in the support of the 
current political regime, as they are the ultimate totalitarian owner’s of the key to changing 
the current economic system, thus easing the dissatisfaction in the environment. 
  
The political support and satisfaction with thee, however, is slightly higher than that of the 
economic. This can be seen when asked “How satisfied are you with the political system that 
exists today in Cuba”, again with emphasis on system, that is the post-revolutionary 
ideology, a total of 53% declares themselves not too/not at all satisfied with the current 
regime, whereas 39% sees themselves as very/somewhat satisfied with the current way of 
doing politics (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). 
Where all of this data becomes interesting is in relation to what this dissatisfaction is 
attributed. When asked “why are you not satisfied with the political system that exists today 
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in Cuba?” the surveyed sample, 49% of them, attribute their dissatisfaction to the general 
lack of freedom, whereas 26% point towards the lack of economic development in the 
country (Amandi & Bendixen 2015).  
  
This shows a weaker causality between lack of economic improvement and the system 
thereof and the support to the current political system, but again it raises another question and 
demand to the political system. There is still a serious issue with 53% dissatisfied with the 
current state of the regime, and many of them calling for more freedom, this issue is still 
subordinate to economic reform as 79 % demands change in this area as well (Amandi & 
Bendixen 2015). This is also expressed by the percentage of people calling for more political 
parties, when asked “Do you think Cuba should have more political parties or is one party 
enough?” 52% calls for more than one political party (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). With the 
knowledge presented of how Cuba is constructed, this goes hand in hand with the demand for 
more freedom and dissatisfaction with the political system.  
  
Transforming	demands	into	issues	–	or	non-transition 
  
According to Easton’s theory (1957), these identified systems of demands, in this case 
identified as economic and political demands, are not necessarily transformed into an issue. 
An issue, being a significant topic deemed fit for discussion in the ‘black box’ by the political 
system, ultimately being processed and causing an output for the environment to consider. 
But not all demands are transformed into ‘fit’ issues for discussion. Many demands either die 
at birth, or stick around in the environment for the time being, as long as the prerequisite 
support is present to speak their case. What distinguishes an issue from a demand is the 
presence of a strong support in the process, or as in the case of a totalitarian regime like 
Cuba, a leadership willing to listen to the demands, for a demand to have enough tailwind to 
venture into the political system (Easton 1957). 
  
With the Cuban political system, and the possibilities of expressing opinion, in mind it is of 
paramount importance to establish a relationship between demand and actual possibilities of 
transforming issues into final output through the Cuban political system (Easton 1957). 
Having established the primary demands, better economic situations and more freedom, we 
must evaluate the current state of either receiving the necessary support or the leniency of the 
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Cuban totalitarian regime to listen to its citizens. Judging from Freedom House's 2015 report, 
the overall score on all aspects of freedom are deemed ‘not free’, giving the next worst 
possible mark, furthermore scoring a 6,5 out of 7, with 7 being the worst (Freedomhouse 
2015). The numerical and phrased meaning of this ought to be seen in the methodology of 
Freedomhouse. The research and rating processes are done by analysis taking in a broad 
range of sources to do a comparative study, enabling a relative understanding the case of 
Cuba is through the judged values. Looking at the parameters of producing a demand from 
the people, namely through exercising civil liberties, we see from the score in ‘freedom of 
expression’ on the island that producing any attention to get support for the demand is 
virtually impossible. With a score of 4 out of 16, with 16 being the best possible environment 
for freedom of expression or belief, and with the knowledge presented that all media outlets, 
as well as internet access, are owned and controlled by the government, means that producing 
anything that has not been supplied by the state is considered enemy propaganda, illegal and 
thus punishable (Freedomhouse 2015). Apart from Freedom House's reports on freedom of 
expression, we can see from the survey conducted by Bendixen & Amandi, that when asked 
about “do you always express yourself freely or do you feel that you have to careful about 
what you say?” 75% expresses that they are careful whenever they voice out their opinion, 
which furthers Freedomhouse’s findings (Amandi & Bendixen 2015).  
  
Furthermore, in the quest of raising awareness, for a demand, to gain support, is not possible 
in Cuba through the use of freedom of expression, be it internet or written publications, 
popular assembly may prove to be a way to circumvent this issue, but once again, the 
totalitarian regime steps in to prohibit this from happening in producing demands. Judging 
from Freedomhouse’s findings within the field of ‘associational and organisational rights’, 
exhibits even less of a possibility to further a demand from the people, with a total score of 0 
out of 12, with 12 being the best (Freedomhouse 2015). It is written into the Cuban 
constitution that any assemble by citizens are limited, to the extent that if they are against the 
existence or objectives of the socialist states, they are deemed illegal (Constitution Net 2015). 
The one support, as seen from a human rights perspective, which could be considered 
sufficient in turning a demand into an issue is from the US (Freedomhouse 2015), especially 
following the policy change following the sparked relations with the US an easing of internal 
repression was expected. But a short couple of weeks following the resurgence of relations, 
the government exercised their constitutional power and cracked down and arrested a group 
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of people, artists and journalists, airing dissatisfaction with the situation on the island 
(Freedomhouse 2015). 
The lack of attempts to circumvent this totalitarian control is not an issue as exemplified. 
Vicari (2014) has studied the use of blogs in Cuba. Blogs are a creator of rhetorics and a 
direct involvement in politics, as well as being a geopolitical issue of freedom and rights 
(Vicari 2014). Vicari (2014) argues that blogs can create consciousness and potential for 
political action by addressing political issues swiftly and without editorial limits. 
This complete government ownership of rights of expression created an unhealthy, pro versus 
con situation, where both of the two existing media outlets are positioned towards the Cuban 
regime, where one outlet shares American values, and the other is controlled by the 
leadership expressing pro-Cuba values. Furthermore, Cuba has limited the use of Internet for 
certain parts of the population, however since 2007, the number of blog collectives has been 
slowly rising in the dark (Vicari 2014). In these collectives, as well as Cuba’s ‘high’ society, 
politics, separation and other popular culture phenomenon are discussed too much distress of 
the Cuban leadership (Vicari 2014). According to Vicari (2014) 66 % of the blogs discuss the 
revolutionary ideas of injustice, and ‘double morality’ is also a big theme as many Cubans 
adjust their public attitude in order to please state policies. Blogs can create consciousness 
about certain political issues, and possibly be a threat to the Cuban leadership. Vicari’s 
(2014) findings show that the Cuban blog collectives present an overall strong picture of 
political raw material for example personal encounters and experiences; however, the 
blogging community as a whole is fragmented, inexperienced and lacks the power to break 
through.  
 
Overall it is fairly easy to establish a sense of a broken link between demand and issues in the 
transformative stage. There exists no mechanism, whatsoever, that indicates any abilities to 
converge the two or attract any support, as neither mobilisation nor tools for mobilisation are 
available. This leaves only one actor left in the process of initiating the mechanism, namely 
the totalitarian regime, as they are complete owners of spurring or cracking down demand. 
Hence, we must assume that the totalitarian regime, which is the ‘black box’, acts proactively 
or is aware of public demand even though the input channels are lacking, we still see a 
political outcome in line with the demands. This tells us that the black box is engaged in 
creating policies suited to public opinion in order to satisfy them to the extent the leadership 
agrees.  
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A demand on the island can only become an issue if deemed suitable by the Castro regime, or 
as argued in the forthcoming analysis by support from US. 
Indications are that only the general human rights situation has been sacrificed as to wield the 
destiny of the regime, but as this paper will examine further on, by attempting to ease 
pressure from the environment, through introducing economic reforms, public opinion ought 
to be bettered. It seems as the economic manifested demands are utilised and improved by the 
government, as a lever, for the survival of the totalitarian regime and ideology on the island, 
thus compromising the humanitarian rights to enable the ownership of them to dictate what 
demands become issues. 
External	Actors	Impact	on	Cuban	Reformation	
 
This section analyses the external actors’ relevance to Cuba and to what extent they have had 
an impact on influencing Cuban domestic policy-making and foreign policy. The analysis 
focuses on the external actors influences - such as implementation or relaxation of laws - and 
compare them to the level of reformation implemented in Cuba and to what degree it can be 
matched with the cyclical or evolutionary model theory. The section has been limited to 
analysing the influence of only the most important actors in which it is deemed that the 
Soviet Union, The US, Obama, Venezuela and Chávez are relevant. 
 
The gradual liberalisation of the Cuban economy started paying off and from 1995 to 2000, 
they had an average annual GDP per capita rate of 3.4% (Corrales 2004). While they were 
still 20% below the level in 1989, the economy was definitely improving. Either way, the 
Cuban government began slowing down the introduction of new economic reforms possible 
causing yet another economic declining development from 2001-2003, which this time did 
not instigate the need for new market liberalisation reforms (Corrales 2004). The political 
election of President Chávez in Venezuela in 1999 is often argued as the main influence 
causing these contradictive actions. 
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(Figure 3, Hernandez-Catá 2013) 
 
Chávez’ election started a close relationship with Fidel and in many aspects began to look 
like the alliance Cuba had once had with the Soviet Union. As seen in Figure 3, Venezuelan 
foreign assistance from 2005 - 2011 even reached levels comparable with the assistance 
provided by the Soviet Union from 1985 - 1991. Cuban medical personnel and teachers were 
exchanged for Venezuelan subsidised oil, reducing Cuba’s dependence on international 
trading partners thereby easing the international pressure allowing Fidel to reverse the 
economic liberalisation reformation up until his presidential handover to his brother Raúl 
(Perez 2009). 
 
Chávez’ death brought political instability to the country and uncertainty for the Venezuelan-
Cuban cooperation and ever since, the amount of subsidised oil sent to Cuba and the number 
of medical personnel sent to Venezuela, have been decreasing (Sweig & Bustamante 2013). 
Cuba might have realised that being dependent on only one partner is too risky, which 
explains their recent cooperation with Brazil in which they have agreed to open up a line of 
credit to renovate and expand five Cuban airports and hire 6000 Cuban doctors for Brazilian 
hospitals (Sweig & Bustamante 2013). 
Mesa-Lago cyclical theory makes itself applicable in the case of the embargo enforcement, 
which happened through the Torricelli law in 1992 and Helms-Burton act in 1996, and in the 
election of Chávez in 1999. The new ally they found in Venezuela worked great as a 
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replacement for the Soviet Union, while the combination of increased pressure from the US 
and a new opening in trade from both EU in 1996 and Venezuela in 1999 can all be argued as 
being political and economic inputs that have resulted in the stagnation of the economic 
reformation, which happened in 2000 and lasted up until 2008 (Pérez-López 2003). 
 
Improving	Relations	
 
The relations between the US and Cuba from 1959 - 1996, have been dominated by sanctions 
and laws, made with the purpose of isolating Cuba economically, in order to force a regime 
and leadership change. It is hard to say to what extent these external actions have had an 
effect on Cuba’s market reformation, but referring back to the evolutionary theory proposed 
by Morris (2008), it fits her argument that the initial implementation of the American 
embargo have influenced Cuba in such a way that they sought to increase their sovereignty 
and communist ideology and society up until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1990. 
The collapse threw the Cuban economy into turmoil and the government was forced, due to 
external factors, to start a reformation of their economy (Xianglin 2007). Again Morris’ 
argument fits the situation. The Cuban reformation started because of external pressure and 
the collapse of an important ally. It is not based on the cycles but rather a calculated response 
to international pressure (Morris 2008).  
 
2008 marked yet another crucial breakthrough in the Cuban transition, the Presidential 
handover from Fidel to his brother Raúl. The transition marked a new agenda for Cuba’s 
economy and Raúl has been busy implementing reforms, decentralising the agricultural 
sector, expanding the tourism industry, relaxing restrictions on small businesses, expanding 
access to consumer goods and much more (Renwick 2015). 
 
In 2009, a breakthrough in the US-Cuba relations happened, when President Obama directed 
a series of steps that should be taken in order to promote and ease the process of bringing 
together Cuban families that were formerly divided by the embargo on Cuba (Obama 2009). 
The lessening restrictions allowed American citizens to visit their Cuban relatives more than 
once every third year as well as lifting the limits on the amount of money and other goods 
they were allowed to bring with them (Obama 2009). The initiative was welcomed and Raúl 
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shortly after wrote “we are not afraid of dialogue with the," adding: "That is the only way to 
achieve friendship and peace between peoples." (Shear & Kang 2009). 
Obama has since continued his work towards improving the US-Cuban relations and further 
eased the sanctions on Cuba in 2015, by lessening the restrictions on travel and remittances 
further. Furthermore, he has allowed American based telecommunications to start up joint 
ventures in Cuba and export their products as well as allowing certain exporters, 
transportation providers, educational activity organisers, religious organisations and news 
organisations to set up different entities in Cuba (U.S. Department of the Treasury 2015). 
These initiatives have benefitted the US-Cuban relationship in several ways. It was 
announced earlier this summer that the two countries have reopened their embassies, 
restoring diplomatic ties. Furthermore, Obama and Raúl met in April 2015, making it the first 
time the heads of the two nations met since the embargo in 1962. They met to discuss which 
steps could be taken in order to improve their relations and Cuba’s normalisation process 
(Spetalnick et al.  2015). 
 
Obama’s easing on the embargo in 2009 and 2015, as well as the death of Chávez in 2013 
and the branching out to new foreign investors, shows new indicators that might influence 
Cuba towards increasing the amount of reformation again. Raúl has since he took over 
worked towards this goal, so yet again the change in external actions involving Cuba, have 
proved influential in the level of reformation the leadership permits. Furthermore, the 
personal actions initiated by Obama shows his influence as an individual external actor with 
the power to have political impact on Cuba and therefore needs to be recognised as an 
external factor all to himself. 
 
Thus this sector can conclude that the chosen external actors have influenced Cuba’s 
domestic policies and up until now, have had an impact towards the level of reformation 
implemented in Cuba. The analysis can further conclude that Morris’ evolutionary model to 
some extent fits the process Cuba has gone through so far, and that her theory, suggesting that 
external factors plays a crucial role in affecting how inputs turn into the outputs occurring in 
Cuba, is supported by this analysis. 
 
All of these external actors function as input into Cuba’s political system, the process in 
which they become output lie within the black box however, the output can shed some light 
of the reasons behind Cuba letting these external input result in policy changes.  
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Fidel	Castro,	Raúl	Castro	and	Barack	Obama		
 
This section will explore different values and types of leadership imposed by both Fidel and 
Raúl. Furthermore, an understanding of the Castro brothers as actors, and how the meddling 
of a new external actor influences the dynamics of the regime, will be provided.  
Fidel has since 1959 been the dominant character of the communist regime on Cuba. His 
right hand, and brother Raúl was selected as his successor. Fidel has been able to uphold his 
regime for long, but many scholars argue that his passing of the torch might be the end of the 
way for the communist regime (Montaner & Ramonet 2007). This would prove not to be the 
case, and Fidel successfully passed the torch to his brother without creating the complications 
that international Cuba observers had predicted (Sweig 2007). The newly appointed main 
actor on the island, Raúl, did not hold the same charisma as his predecessor. The strengthened 
ties between US and Cuba paved the way for a new external actor, Obama, to have some 
influence on the status quo. 
 
Fidel’s passing of power did not have the effect international observers had predicted it 
would, Raúl succeeded in limiting mistakes and the transition did not influence the regime. 
Ever since Fidel left office, Raúl’s main focus has been maintaining stability and structure on 
the island (Latell 2007). Any slips would hurt the regime, and make it less legitimate in 
public opinion, and cause mass migrations to Florida (Latell 2007). Thereby, paving the way 
for US intervention of the governing form in Cuba. Raúl has been known to adore the 
economic transitions in China and Vietnam (Latell 2007). Raúl made several actions showing 
interest in a hybrid communism as those in China and Vietnam (Latell 2007). Raúl is aware 
of the country's economic trouble, and is determined to figure out how to turn the economy 
around. He has made initiatives to deal with corruption and inefficiencies on the island in 
order to improve the Economy (Latell 2007).  
 
As previously mentioned, Raúl has always been the background man, doing the dirty work of 
Fidel. This of course has hurt his image with the population. The Raúl that the people see is 
nowhere near the same lines as the way inquiries of friends and family describes him. Among 
family and friend he is depicted as being compassionate and emphatic. This indicates a more 
complex Raúl than the one known to the public. In more recent time he has become more 
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relaxed and pragmatic (Latell 2007). Raúl holds great leadership abilities, and delegates’ 
responsibility to different institutions. He utilises personal relationship, and is much more 
dependent on them compared to Fidel. Raúl has a straightforward approach to leadership, 
whereas, Fidel was more idea driven and spontaneous (Latell 2007). 
 
“The younger Castro has been leading Cuba in a manner intended to contrast with Fidel's 
manic, narcissistic style” (Latell 2007). 
 
Raúl has since 1959 led the military and the police on the island, having these two major 
actors on his side has helped Raúl maintain power and prevent civil uprising. Raúl’s 
delegation of power has allowed civilian officials to seek deals with him instead of 
challenging his regime (Latell 2007).    
 
Raúl is aware of the fact that he is walking on a thin line as the head of the Cuban regime, 
and that any mistakes could cause a snowballing effect causing destabilisation of the regime. 
Furthermore, Raúl acknowledges that he has to give civilians opportunities to improve their 
financial situation (Latell 2007). Sweig (2007) argued for Fidel’s final victory in the way he 
passed the torch to his younger brother Raúl, many deem that this is not enough since Raúl 
lacks the charisma and will not be able to use fear and respect as Fidel did (Latell 2007). 
  
Ramonet argues: 
  
“ President Fidel Castro has not been on the job since late last July – that is, it’s already 
been five months “after Fidel.” And yet, nothing has happened. The regime has not 
collapsed, nor have the much- anticipated public protests erupted. The systems are showing 
that it can operate normally under these conditions and the legal institutions are 
withstanding the shock of Fidel’s withdrawal. “(Montaner & Ramonet 2007). 
 
Socialism could have failed in Cuba, however Fidel, through the fear his regime imposes on 
the public, should be credited positive consideration as he managed to maintain a totalitarian 
system for so long (Montaner & Ramonet 2007). 
The controversial embargo that has been placed on Cuba from the US was intended to speed 
up the transition process, ultimately forcing Cuba to alter their political regime in order to 
solve the financial crisis imposed by the embargo. The irony is that the embargo had the 
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exact opposite effect (Montaner & Ramonet 2007). The embargo as previously mentioned 
functioned as a tool to legitimise the Castro regime, the embargo was used as a scapegoat for 
the Castro’s to blame the economic crisis on the US.  
Obama took a different approach and tries inherently to create a connection between 
Washington and Havana. He has shown improvements in this regard, the US policy that was 
once viewed exploiting Cuba, are now being viewed as to favour Cuban’s more than the 
Americans. Research shows that 97 % of the population says that the improved relationship 
between the two nations is good for Cuba. 58 % believes that the new take on the policies 
from the US regarding Cuba, now favours Cuba (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). Whereas 33 % 
believe that the policies are mutually beneficial, and only 5 % believe that the policies 
benefits the US on behalf of Cuba (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). Cubans believe that the 
stronger ties between US and Cuba will not lead to transition of the entire political regime, in 
fact 54 % believes that the political system will stay the same, and only 37 % believes that 
the political system will change on this background, the remainder is experiencing doubt 
about what influences the stronger Havana - Washington ties will have on the political system 
(Amandi & Bendixen 2015). 64 % of the population does believe that the improved 
relationship could lead to changes in the economy system. In regards to actors, the main 
actors has for long been Fidel and Raúl. As leaders the Castro's have been upholding the 
status quo i.e. the communists system (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). Now a new external actor 
has joined in, and as shown in figure 4, 80 % of Cubans are positive towards Obama. In 
comparison only 44 % shows a positive attitude towards Fidel, and 47 % has a positive 
opinion of the contemporary leader Raúl. This indicates that Cubans no longer sees American 
leadership as an enemy, but view them as an ‘ally’, that could improve living amongst 
Cubans (Amandi & Bendixen 2015).  
It could arguably be that this creation of a new external actor, Obama, has caused upsets in 
the status quo, and Raúl now has to make changes in order to restore the status quo, he does 
so through liberalisation of the economy. Furthermore, Raúl has, as mentioned, shortcomings 
compared to his brother’s charismatic self, making the task of maintaining the status quo 
difficult. 
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(Figure 4, Amandi & Bendixen 2015).  
 
Charismatic Leadership 
 
Shortly after the revolution Fidel had manifested himself as the most charismatic of the 
revolutionists, and gathered a group of followers that already supported him heavily, among 
them mainly students (Sweig 2009). Sweig (2009) further emphasises the power of Fidel’s 
charisma, and argues for a lot of credit regarding the survival of the regime should be 
contributed to him, after the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba had strong ties to the 
revolution, not succumbing to American politics over a few material obstacles since the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Arguably, this had something to do with the embargo and the 
general hatred from Cuban’s towards American Culture (Sweig 2009). Even though Fidel had 
success in maintaining the socialist regime through his charisma, Weber (in Mixon 2007) 
argued that this power of charisma is non transferrable, and after passing power to his brother 
Raúl the country should slowly move towards the rational- legal legitimacy, because Raúl is 
not granted the same charisma from his followers as Fidel was assigned. Weber’s (in Mixon 
2007) theory of leadership charisma, disagrees with Sweig’s argument of Fidel’s Last Victory 
(2007). Sweig (2007) argues that the way Fidel was able to implement Raúl as his successor, 
was an advantage and the upset in the status quo as many had speculated did not occur. 
Weber’s theory predicts that if Raúl is not able to build the same charisma as Fidel, he will 
have to legitimise the regime on another background i.e. Traditional or Rational- legal.  
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Fidel has since 1991 been able to maintain the power on the island through his charismatic 
legitimacy as defined by Weber (in Mixon 2007). Though after he passed power to his 
brother this legitimacy was lost, because charisma is not an attribute that Fidel can pass on to 
Raúl. In order to legitimise the regime, Raúl does, according to Weber (in Mixon 2007) have 
two options, he could gather followers and gain charisma through these followers thereby, 
legitimising his regime through charisma. The second option is legitimising his regime on the 
background of rational- legal. 
Cubans desire change, and want economic improvement. The main actors Fidel and Raúl are 
now being challenged from external pressure, in another way than previous. Before the 
external pressure consisted of the embargo, which proved to have an opposite effect. Now the 
external pressure consists of a dialogue, between the US and Cuba, and Obama as a 
representative of the US in general, and now functioning as an external actor upsetting the 
status quo. This new input now forces Raúl to take actions in order to re-establish the status 
quo.  
 
Fidel symbolises the old totalitarian regime, where he utilised charisma in order to legitimise 
the regime, when he passed power to Raúl he was, as the theory suggests, not able to transfer 
his charisma. This in turn affected Raúl so that he had to establish another way to ensure his 
legitimacy. He did so by employing pragmatic leadership tactics focusing on functioning 
needs instead of social needs. This in turn shows two different processes taking place in the 
black box. The difference in these is that where Fidel had charisma and ideology to legitimise 
the regime. Raúl lacks charisma and therefore needs to legitimise his regime by satisfying the 
population through the creation of pleasing outputs. This is what Bedel-Avers et. al. (2009) 
argues as the natural occurrence when the charismatic leader dies, his successor is most likely 
to be the pragmatic leader. 
Tourism	
 
This section will explore the relationship between tourism and traditional socialism in Cuba. 
In many post-socialist developing countries tourism has been implemented as a way of 
introducing foreign capital, building foreign relations and political support (Sanchez & 
Adams 2007). However, tourism does not come without complications, especially for 
socialist nations. In Cuba, a strong ideology has been fundamental to their society, and often 
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shaped economic policies as well. Some scholars, such as Mesa-Lago (in Morris 2008) argue 
that Cuban leadership since the revolution has been willing to comprise ideology for more 
pragmatic economic policies, such as tourism. Morris (2008) contests this notion by 
indicating that Cuba has seen a more evolutionary development in their economy, and that 
tourism is therefore a natural step in the process. Common to these two positions are the view 
on tourism, and what it represents. Tourism in Cuba is seen as a break with ideological 
policy-making. This section will try to understand how tourism compromises ideology in 
Cuba, how, and on what grounds, the industry was created. Lastly, the relationship with US 
on tourism and with the current thaw tells us about Raúl’s way of governing. 
  
The development of Tourism in Cuba 
 
In regards to tourism, Cuba has always been a destination for the supporters of communism 
or Fidel. However, after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Cuba became more attractive to the 
common traveller, both as a piece of communist history, but also because of their culture and 
beautiful landscape. From the beginning of the 1990’s, tourism emerged as a priority sector, 
because of the possibility for foreign investment (Simon 1995). From 1990 to 1994, the 
number of visitors grew by 82%, topping at 620.000 arrivals in 1994, mostly Canadians and 
Europeans (Simon 1995). These trends were unimpressive, when you look at the rest of the 
Caribbean. In 1980, most Caribbean nation’s shifted from traditional agriculture, towards 
market oriented competitive manufacturing industries, but most importantly, tourism (Simon 
1995). In this sense, Cuba was ten years late, and was not even open to US citizens, who 
dominated the Caribbean’s. In 1990, the tourism sector in the Caribbean islands created six 
times the revenue, brought in by traditional agricultural exports (Simon 1995). It is therefore 
natural to think that Cuba would pursue tourism as well. 
In the table provided by Simon (1995) we see that, although small measurements towards 
developing tourism was made before 1990, the industry took off as a result of the government 
allowing for self-employment, the creation of hotels and the Tourism Ministry (Appendix 1, 
table 3). As Simon (1995) argues the Caribbean saw a rise in revenue created from tourism in 
the early 1980’s, which continued to grow through the 1990’s, it is therefore, from an 
economical standpoint, only natural that Cuba followed in their neighbour’s footsteps, and 
focused on developing their tourism sector. 
As described by Simon (1995), Cuba did create a tourism industry, but two things were 
different. First of all, the reason behind the creation of the industry in Cuba is fundamentally 
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different from the other Caribbean nations. While Cuba also saw tourism as an opportunity to 
create revenue, and balance their economy between agriculture and tourism, they simply had 
lost valuable ‘business partners’ and was therefore forced to rethink their economy. Cuba 
looked to their neighbours, and saw tourism created instant revenue. 
 
Cuba pushed into tourism? 
 
In 1990, when the Eastern Bloc resolved, Cuba had to look in other directions for foreign 
capital. It was obvious that the Eastern Bloc could not continue to subsidize Cuba 
exemplified by “The collapse in availability of foreign exchange for imports – from around 9 
billion US dollars in 1989 to 2.3 US dollars in 1993…” (Morris 2008). This drop created an 
imperative for Cuba to open up their economy to tourism (Sanchez & Adams 2007). As 
mentioned earlier, in the Caribbean region, the tourism sector created revenue six times larger 
than what was created by agriculture (Simon 1995). Caribbean tourism was growing, and is 
was therefore only natural for Cuba, to substitute their relationship with the Eastern Bloc, and 
the money they received through subsidies and trade agreements, with a new sector of their 
economy: Tourism. 
 
Even though tourism had immediate upside, and could bring Cuba instant revenue, it still 
posed a threat to Cuban ideology. When Cuba began to embrace tourism while maintaining 
socialism, they were forced to make substantial economic changes. They liberalised the 
possibility for foreign investment and legalised the US dollar, two measurements that 
probably would not have happened if the Soviet Union still existed (Sanchez & Adams 
2007). These initiatives led to the creation of inequality by legal or illegal entrepreneurship as 
well as other negatives caused by the capitalist economy (Sanchez & Adams 2007). 
Inequality is a huge problem in a socialist nation that builds their legitimacy on equality and a 
fair division of resources (Sanchez & Adams 2007). Tourism is therefore a noticeable 
comprise for the Cuban leadership, because of its apparent negative outcome, however as 
Mesa-Lago (in Morris 2008) argues, pragmatic economic policy has been used repeatedly by 
the Cuban government in order to boost their own economy and provide economic 
opportunities for the Cuban people. Another issue is that the tourism sectors provides an 
economic benefit not seen in other industries in Cuba, a doctor in Cuba reportedly earn less 
money than bellhops at the international hotels (Sanchez & Adams 2007). This clearly 
weakens the medical sector, which is one of the foundational pillars of the socialist nation, 
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and one of the areas where Cuba gains international recognition. Tourism therefore clearly 
comprises the traditional socialist values in Cuba, in exchange for hard foreign currency and 
better international relations. Tourism is clearly favourable from an economic perspective; 
however, it comes at the cost of the socialist ideology. A cost Cuba has been willing to pay. 
 
US - Cuba relations, Tourism 
 
We have now seen how the relationship between Cuba and tourism begun, and to what extent 
tourism compromises socialist values. Another factor in the development of Cuban tourism is 
their relationship with the US. US citizens are among the people who travel most in the 
Caribbean’s, and could therefore be a great source of income for Cuba (Simon 1995). Before 
the revolution in 1959, approximately 86 % of all visitors in Cuba came from the US, this 
abruptly ended after the revolution because the new government saw tourism “largely 
associated with the capitalist evils of corruption, drugs, social inequality, and racism” 
(Taylor Jr. & Mcglyn 2009). As we have seen, the Cuban leadership would later succumb to 
some capitalist initiatives, and as expected, they did lead to social inequality as well as other 
issues, such as prostitution. Obviously, the collapse of the Soviet Union forced Cuba to look 
in other directions for foreign capital, but what role has the Obama administration played in 
furthering Cuba’s tourism sector? 
The recent news point towards a liberalisation in the restriction on tourism between the two 
nations, and both Obama and Raúl has publicly spoken on the issue, and argued a cooperation 
to be mutually beneficial. In 2015, Obama after a meeting with Raúl was quoted saying: 
"…But in terms of the overall direction of Cuba policy, I think there is a strong majority both 
in the United States and in Cuba that says our ability to engage, to open up commerce and 
travel and people to people exchanges is ultimately going to be good for Cuban people." 
(Liptak and Acosta 2015).  
 
Cuba was until recently still on the US list of sponsors of terror, and even though there is still 
a lot of issues between the two states the relationship is slowly moving towards mutual 
agreement, and the fact that the two heads of state are willing to meet shows their relationship 
might be thawing (Yuhas 2015). The fact that the Obama administration has removed Cuba 
from the terror list is great news for the relationship and for Cuba themselves, as American 
banks and credit card companies now are more willing to do business in Cuba (Yuhas 2015). 
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This is positive news for Cuba’s most liberal sectors, as tourism would substantially benefit 
from Cuba improving their relationship with US, and the increased opportunity for the 
American financial sector would definitely benefit cash flows from the US to Cuba. 
Even though the relationship has taken strides, actual as well as symbolic, it is still extremely 
difficult for a US citizen to legally enter Cuba. “The Cuban Assets Control Regulations of the 
U.S. Treasury Department require that persons subject to U.S. jurisdiction obtain a Treasury 
license before engaging in any transaction related to travel to, from and within Cuba. 
Transactions related to tourist travel are not licensable. This restriction includes tourist 
travel to Cuba from or through a third country such as Mexico or Canada.” 
(Havana.usembassy.gov 2015). 
The above is taken directly from the US embassy of Havana’s homepage, and clearly states 
that it is illegal for US citizens to travel to Cuba for reason of tourism, however the number 
of Americans travelling to Cuba grows every year. There are a couple of answers to these 
questions. According to the Guardian, US citizens visit Cuba from third countries such as 
Mexico (The Guardian 2015). This is technically still illegal, however much harder for Cuba 
and the US to detect and enforce. Another reason is due to the Obama administration's easing 
of the travel regulations, which made it easier for US citizens to obtain the necessary 
paperwork to visit Cuba (The Guardian 2015). 
Why is the US initiating easier travel to Cuba, and why is Raúl allowing more US visitors? 
A whole study could be conducted about the incentives of the US government and the 
potential they see in some of Cuba’s new sectors such as telecommunication and tourism, but 
also the traditional agricultural sector. However, this analysis will focus on the underlying 
reasons of Raúl, and why he is thawing the relationship with the US through tourism. 
 
As we have seen earlier in this chapter, the road from public opinion to political output is 
complicated and undemocratic in Cuba. But Raúl’s leadership seems to fulfil many of the 
wishes of the Cuban population even without them directly impacting his decision-making. 
Drawing on some of our points from earlier in this chapter, we can see that 96 % agree that 
tourism is the solution to the current economic state of affairs (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). In 
addition, improving the economy is viewed as a more important issue than opening the 
political system. These public opinions are actually well represented in Raúl’s actions 
towards tourism, and the strides made collectively with the US. It shows a level of public 
consciousness from Raúl that he has the ability to conduct these policies without having 
direct input from the public. This point is furthered when we factor in Obama’s popularity in 
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relation to Raùl’s. As shown earlier in this chapter: “...80 % of Cubans are positive towards 
Obama. In comparison only 44 % shows a positive attitude towards Fidel, and 47 % has a 
positive opinion of the contemporary leader Raúl.” (Amandi & Bendixen 2015). In this 
sense, Raúl clearly benefits politically by thawing his us relationship and conducting politics 
with the US, instead of against them.  
 
It can be argued that tourism has functioned as an important catalyst, in Cuba’s process 
toward a more liberalised economy. When the fall of the Berlin Wall forced Cuba to look in 
other directions in order to obtain foreign capital, tourism was, because of its success in 
Cuba’s neighbour countries, the obvious path to follow (Simon 1995). However, this path 
created some complication for Cuba, as an exploitation of the tourism industry clearly 
comprises socialist values. This was also the result, as Cuba saw rises in inequality, however 
as Mesa-Lago argues, the Cuban leadership has historically always been willing to 
compromise their ideology for economic benefits through periods of time. Nevertheless, 
Cuba has pursued tourism full time to the obvious satisfaction of the population as the 
industry creates jobs, and the opportunity for independence. Moreover, Cuba has in the 
process of developing their tourism consistently bettered their US relation, arguably, 
observing the possible economic benefit of Americans tourist or just in order to gain political 
support for the Raúl leadership.  
 
To sum it up, the collapse of the Soviet Union, and later the death of Chavez caused an 
economic incentive for Cuba to pursue further development in tourism, together with a broad 
public consensus that tourism is the right industry to develop all functioned as input into the 
black box, and may have pushed the outcome of the black box. The success of Cuba’s 
Caribbean neighbours also proved as an input, because Cuba arguably saw tourism function 
in states alike themselves. As a result of these inputs, Cuba, with Raúl in the lead, aimed to 
improve their US relations, infuse economic growth by developing their tourism sector. Raúl 
also saw a need for him to equate himself with Obama in order to gain confidence from his 
population and strengthen the black box.  
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Conclusion	
 
In this chapter, we started by looking at the channels of input in Cuba, where we saw a 
broken link between the demand of the population and the black box leading to a possibly 
skewed output in policies. However, after analysing public demand through our quantitative 
data, we learned that the Cuban leadership to a large extent were meeting the demands of the 
population. Thus, even though there is a clear lack of democratic input channels in which the 
population can voice demands, leadership is still able to conduct policies, for the people, in a 
satisfying manner. The public showed a demand for policies improving economic growth, 
and thawing their relationship with the US. Cuba’s leadership has shown the willingness to 
fulfil this demand by focusing on bettering tourism, which is a sector improving both the 
aforementioned issues.  
 
The external influence on Cuba has a two-faced nature, as Cuba moves from being impacted 
more by communist nations towards Western civilisation and the US. In 1990, the Soviet 
Union collapsed which had a major impact on Cuba, and in parts forced them to think 
differently about their economy. This created the tourism sector, which is still under 
development till this day. In 1999, Cuba began a partnership with Venezuela trading trained 
doctors for things of value, such as oil. This was a reaction to the US embargo, which can be 
seen as pushing Cuba towards communism for economic, but maybe also ideological reasons. 
However, a time came where Cuba and the US saw a mutual opportunity, and began thawing 
their relationship. The Obama administration has worked with Raúl in order to create a better 
relationship between the two nations. This has created better grounds for developing the 
tourist industry, thus the economy, has led to a rise in Raúl’s acclaim as he shows willingness 
to do what many Cubans want, better the relationship with the US. Another reason why he 
has taken these measures is because he lacks the ethos of former leader, Fidel. We have 
examined how Fidel was a strong character, and that was a part of his success and ability to 
perpetuate his system, however such character and ethos is not transferable to one's 
descendant, and Raúl therefore had to go in a different direction. Showing willingness to 
compromise their ideology, using tourism as a way to appease public demand, tourism should 
be seen as the ultimate tool of the Cuban leadership.F 
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Chapter	5:	Discussion	
 
Introduction	
 
In this last part of the project, we aim to discuss and perhaps settle some of the debates 
analysed and presented. We delve into the debates considered in our literature review, and the 
question of US influence examined throughout our project. This is done in order to explain 
how the findings of our analysis fit with our existing knowledge presented in Chapters 2 and 
3, and how this existing knowledge is influenced by our findings. Furthermore, we aim to 
relate the many positions of the scholars to our data analysed, and in this way estimate the 
legitimacy of their assumptions in relation to their position.  
 
The first point that will be discussed is considered in our literature review and later in 
analysis, concerns the impact of external relations on policy making in Cuba. Drawing on the 
points presented by different authors in the literature review, and data in analysis, the 
following section will discuss to what extent external actions shape Cuban politics, and 
hopefully thereby shedding light on where the focus of future analyses should be placed. 
 
Treto (2009) puts focus on internal influence by quoting some of Raúl’s first speeches after 
his inauguration. He states that no decisions in Cuba will be made on the basis of pressure 
from any country (Raúl Castro in Treto 2009). Treto (2009) agrees with Raúl, and believes 
Cuba to be to some extent are independent from external influence, however, he also sees the 
need for deliberation and development of a stronger academic community in order to further 
independence. Mesa-Lago’s theoretical assumption, that Cuban policy making is cyclical 
furthers the assumption of Cuba as being politically independent by arguing their ability to 
change style of policy making from day to day (Morris 2008). On the other hand, Hoffmann 
(1998), Hernandéz-Cata (2013) and Morris (2008) openly disagree with this view. They 
argue that the collapse of the Soviet Union, Venezuela and especially the US has influenced 
Cuban policy making to a large extent, pointing to the US embargo and the collapse of the 
Soviet Union as main factors. 
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When we relate these views to the findings of our analysis, a few complications come to 
mind. Are we talking about, direct or indirect factors, and when in the line of history are we 
aiming to understand?  
 
We believe that the possible mechanism we have chosen to analyse represent both internal 
and external factors equally, giving them both a chance to prove their importance.  
 
First, we delved into the importance of free speech, in order to create inputs for the political 
system. This showed that Cuba lacks channels of input, and that the people are willing to 
compromise political reform in order to gain economy prowess. This means that a possible 
source of internal influence is missing, however our quantitative survey shows that the 
policies created by the Cuban leadership to a large extent resonates with the population, by 
meeting their demands expressed in the survey. Therefore, we see Cuba as being proactive in 
their relationship with the population, however there is no way of knowing whether the 
policies are a result of the leadership recognising the people's demand. We categorise this as 
an indirect factor, as we believe the leadership to be aware of the demands of their 
population, even though no strong channels of input exists.  
 
Both in Chapter 3 and 4, we focus explicitly on the external factors. This is a result of the 
positions presented in our literature review. We feel that the issue of tourism is a great way to 
analyse external influences on Cuba through time, as it deals with both the influence of the 
Soviet Union and later the US.  
 
In the section, we analyse some of Cuba’s external relations and to what extent they have 
influenced Cuba. Here we look at the US embargo, and how it increased Cuban ideology by 
creating a strong scapegoat, from which Cuba could blame all negatives. Except for the 
obvious economic implications, the embargo had a strong social impact on Cuba, which 
strengthened their political system by creating a common enemy. The embargo should be 
viewed as a direct impact, one that created major implications both economically and socially 
in Cuba. 
 
In the next section, we will touch upon the impact of the Soviet Union, however now we will 
focus on the appearance of a new ideological ally: Venezuela. In the late 1990’s, Cuba started 
an alliance with Venezuela, exchanging academic medical personnel for oil, giving Cuba a 
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much-needed economic boost, allowing them to ease the pressure from other international 
trade partners. The benefits of Venezuela was due to shared ideological values, which 
allowed Cuba to again strengthen their ideology functioning as the beginning of one of Mesa-
lago’s cycles. We don't necessarily see this as direct external influence, but more as a mutual 
beneficial trade agreement created on equal terms between two nations of common ideology.  
 
The	tourism	timeline	
 
As Morris (2008) argues, things changed following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Cuba 
lost substantial economic and ideological support. Because of the disappearance of trade 
agreements between Cuba and the Soviet Union, Cuba had to search elsewhere for foreign 
capital. The collapse of the Soviet Union, and the loss of their economic support, should, 
according to our analysis, be seen as an external direct factor, as it caused Cuba to create a 
new industry. An industry that is now fundamental to Cuba’s economy.  
 
We argue that Cuba realised the potential of the tourist industry, because they saw it excel in 
neighbouring countries. This is an indirect factor, but it also, again, highlights Cuban 
leadership's ability to act independently when an opportunity presents itself.  
 
When it comes to Cuba’s relationship with the US regarding tourism, we see that both nations 
have made attempts to thaw their relationship in order to strengthen the tourist industry, but 
also their relationship.  
 
From 2008, when Raúl became the leader of Cuba, the relations between Cuba and the US 
have improved as a result of actions made by the Obama administration, and Raúl’s 
exploration of the tourist sector. In this case, we see interplay between internal and external 
factors, as Raúl has recognised popular demand for more concurrence with the US, as well as 
improving the economy by furthering tourism. All these conclusions are based on analysis of 
quantitative data, and point towards Cuban leadership being both influenced by US action, 
but also shaping the tourist industry themselves. In this sense, we view Cuba as an 
independent actor in their recent development in tourism, even though the US also has had 
some influence. This does again point towards Cuban leadership being extremely aware of 
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popular demands, as they over and over again seem to act on their behalf even though their 
political systems lack serious channels of demand. 
 
Concluding whether or not Cuba in general is influenced by external factors is not the focus 
of this discussion, however we can point towards places in time, where a clear external factor 
have pushed Cuba in one or another direction. But we have no way of knowing if this is the 
truth. That is the imperfection of the black box in Easton’s theory of political systems. What 
we can show, however, is that Cuba’s policies are a product of the interplay between external 
and internal factors, but also that the internal factors are limited and there is an apparent 
strong knowledge in the leadership when it comes to popular demand, as we repeatedly see a 
government able to stay on top of their population by doing what they want without political 
input. Hence, implying that the Cuban leadership is proactively attempting to satisfy 
demanded issues, by acting according to public demand. 
 
Cuba	as	a	unique	case  
  
As seen in our literature review there is a debate on how Cuba should be studied. Some 
scholars argue that Cuba should be viewed as a unique case; the major attribute to this side of 
the debate is Treto (2009), who is supported in this view by Mesa-Lago (in Morris 2008). 
Sweig & Bustamante (2013) and Treto (2009) argues that contemporary transformation ideas 
cannot be used in the case of Cuba, since Cuba did not have the same point of departure as 
previous transformations, and therefore would not end up as a classical capitalistic 
democracy. Thus, since Cuba’s point of departure is different from those nations subject to 
traditional transitology, the outcome is most likely to not fit that of traditional transitology. 
Differing from nations such as the Eastern Bloc, Vietnam and China, in their ideology, 
leadership style and the way external impact from for US has shaped them, Sweig (2013) 
adds that factors such as Cuba’s aging population, their proximity to the US and its 
combination of advanced human capital yet deteriorating infrastructure is among some of the 
reason why Cuba should be seen as a unique case and not be studied through traditional 
transition theory. 
In opposition, Pumar (2008) argues that Cuba is not so unique after all, as he argues that 
Cuba could be compared in many regards to Vietnam or China who have recently gone 
through a transformation process, perhaps quite similar to the one occurring on Cuba.  
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Throughout this project we have examined transition theories, namely shock therapy, 
evolutionary transition, Weber’s charismatic leadership and Easton’s analysis of the political 
system, hoping that they could offer insight into which transitional mechanisms should be 
applied when looking at Cuba’s transition. Through studying Cuba it became more and more 
apparent to us that, one single theory does not provide insight in Cuba’s transition, but a 
combination of several theories could prove useful. Therefore, in a sense, both sides of debate 
regarding Cuba as a unique case should have their say. One cannot merely just disregard all 
transition theories, as Treto (2009) suggests. Though this might be true Treto (2009) still has 
a point in that no transformation theory accounts for all aspects of Cuba’s case. So a mixture 
of existing transition theories could hold importance, for creating a framework for examining 
underlying mechanisms for Cuba’s transition from a central planned-economy towards a 
market oriented economy.  
 
The existing transformation theories suggest three possible outcomes in the case of transition: 
1) cyclical transformation, 2) evolutionary transformation and 3) shock therapy 
transformation. Cyclic transformation revolves around the idea that Cuba’s transition should 
be viewed as occurring in cycles of transformation created by the Cuban government without 
external influences. Evolutionary transformation should be viewed as a linear process of 
transformation, a slowly developing transition heavily influenced by external actors. The 
shock therapy transformation is concerned with the idea of instant implementation of 
democracy and a market economy. In the findings it is shown that the third option of shock 
therapy is not applicable in the case of Cuba, first of all since we, based on our analysis and 
literature review, find it highly unlikely that Cuba will accept democratisation and second of 
all, since the transition happening in Cuba is a process and not an instant change on the 
background of one political decision. The evolutionary model could to some degree be 
adopted in the case of Cuba. Cuba has for several years shown capitalistic tendencies in their 
economy, and it looks like it has a linear approach to the process as of right now. Since these 
changes have only been occurring since 1990, it is fair to argue that the process is linear, but 
at the same time this could merely be the first cycle that has not had time to develop yet. 
Furthermore, According to Weber’s theory he predicts that after Fidel is replaced by his 
successor Raúl, support for the regime should show decline on the background of a lack of 
charisma, and move towards rational- legal legitimacy (in Mixon 2007). 
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Cuba is a unique case, unique in the sense that no existing transformation theory is 100 % 
applicable when examining Cuba, but theories do hold partial answers and should not be 
disregarded on this behalf. So in that sense Cuba is unique, but comparisons between Cuba, 
China and Vietnam for instance could be done as cases of transition, but as a case of non- 
transition the closest comparison is with North Korea (Saxonberg 2013).   
 
Conclusion	
 
On the grounds of our ontological considerations, stemming from critical realisms, we 
created and conducted a literature review assessing the key debates, authors and theories 
within the established literature on Cuban policy-making. In enabling our findings in the 
selected literature, a larger picture was drawn up as to commence a theoretical and 
methodology discussion. The debates considered were engaged in analytical areas such as 
Fidel’s importance, the external inputs and a discussion about whether or not Cuba was 
experiencing a cyclical development or an evolutionary process ranging from ideological to 
pragmatic policies. These debated functioned as the foundation for our analysis. A debate 
regarding the literature on the uniqueness of Cuba and traditional transitology spawned our 
theoretical framework as we became aware of the pitfalls of transitology, and that viewing 
Cuba as unique limited our theoretical comparisons. This made us construct our own 
theoretical framework drawing on points from traditional transitology, as well as regime 
survival theory, charismatic leadership theory and the debate between cyclical and 
evolutionary political development.  
 
 
Through the literature review we have established what factors, could possibly have 
influenced the transition, and utilises Chapter 3 to further understand these factors, such as 
Cuba’s foreign relations, and a chronological description of changes in the economic system. 
Furthermore, chapter three describes events that provided a foundation for the analysis 
obtaining the necessary knowledge of Cuba’s historical development, politically and 
economically.  
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In our process of analysing how input, impacting the decision making of Raúl’s government 
we learned that there is a broken link of input in Cuba, and that the broken link has almost no 
influence on the balance between public demand and Raúl’s policies. By contrasting our 
quantitative data to Raúl’s policy, it is evident how he acts according to public demand by 
creating a better environment for the tourism sector to flourish and improving Cuba’s 
relationship with the US. Through Weber’s charismatic leadership theory, we saw how 
Fidel’s ethos was not transferrable to Raúl, and he therefore had to create an image for 
himself, the image being closer to that of Obama, again on line with public demand. When 
we see Raúl act accordingly to public demand, we conclude that he is proactively acting in 
favour of his system by conducting pragmatic policies instead of ideological policies. This 
could also be a result of external pressure, however the US has in recent years taken a less 
hostile stand on Cuba, which, in turn has created a positive view of the US on Cuba. Cuba’s 
partnership with Venezuela highlighted a return to ideology in the early 2000’s, however the 
mutual beneficial agreement dwindled as both Chavez and Fidel left office.  
With no economic partnership available, Cuba chooses to develop their tourism sector. We 
have had a specific focus on tourism in this project, as we believe it embodies all of our 
analysed factors, and functions as an example of Raúl’s, and before him Fidel’s, willingness 
to adopt pragmatic policy beneficiary to them. For Raúl, tourism functioned as the perfect 
case, as it moved him closer to Obama, ignited economic growth and thawed US relations, all 
without public input. 
 
The findings in the analysis, is being discussed in relation to the findings in the literature 
review.  
Through the discussion we aim to settle some of the debates that appeared during the 
analysis. One of the debates revolve around the value of external inputs, Treto (2009) argues 
that transition in Cuba will not be on the background of external factors, but should, if ever, 
happen due to internal factors. Easton (1957) on the other hand, argues for the value of 
external factors, and in the findings in the analysis we see that the improved relationship 
between Cuba and the US to some degree have influenced the transition from a planned- 
economy towards a market-economy, so we would argue that outside influence have had an 
impact on Cuba. Another of the debates is how to study Cuba, or Cuba as a unique case. Here 
we discuss if Cuba is a unique case or not, and argue for that no existing transformation 
theory developed is suitable for. We further argue that Cuba are moving along the lines of 
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something quite similar to the evolutionary model of transformation, but we do not know for 
sure since it could be the first of the cycles from the cyclic transformation theory.  
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